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INTRODUCTION 
Electronic databases1 provide information users with ex-
traction tools enabling them to sort and arrange data in ways 
meaningful to them; extending the manipulative abilities of 
information users’ minds adds immense value to what 
would otherwise be a mass of incoherent, disparate data.2  
 
1. The European Database Directive defines a database as “a collection of 
works, data or other independent materials arranged in a systematic or methodi-
cal way and capable of being accessed by electronic or other means.”  Council 
Directive No. 96/9, art. 1(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 24 (1996) [hereinafter Database Di-
rective].  The Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 
1996 (“U.S. Proposal”) defines a database as “a collection, assembly or compila-
tion, in any form or medium now or later known or developed, of works, data or 
other materials, arranged in a systematic or methodical way.”  H.R. REP. NO. 
3531, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1996).  The Draft Treaty on Intellectual Property 
in Respect of Databases defines a database as “a collection of independent works, 
data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and capable 
of being accessed by electronic or other means.”  Diplomatic Conference on Certain 
Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions, Draft Treaty on Intellectual Property in 
Respect of Databases, art. 2(1) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996) [hereinaf-
ter WIPO Proposal].  Using the right collection tool, almost anything, including 
numbers, text, audio, and images, can be reduced to binary form which can then 
be compiled in a database.  However, the U.S. and WIPO Proposal (“Proposals”) 
exclude computer programs from their protection, and the Database Directive 
excludes “computer programs used in the making or operation of databases ac-
cessible by electronic means” from its protection.  See H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra, § 
3(d); WIPO Proposal, supra, art. 1(4) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996); 
Database Directive, supra, art. 1(3), O.J. L 77/20, at 24 (1996).  In addition, the Da-
tabase Directive and WIPO Proposal exclude certain dependent works.  See Da-
tabase Directive, supra, recital 17, O.J. L 77/20, at 21 (1996); WIPO Proposal, supra, 
Notes § 2.03 WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996). 
2. The value of the global information industry could reach $3 trillion dol-
lars by the early 21st Century.  Statement on Dismantling the U.S. Department of 
Commerce:  Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Government Management, Information 
and Technology of the House Comm. on Government Reform and Oversight, 104th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Ronald H. Brown, Secretary of Commerce).  
Note, however, that the “global information industry” referred to by the late Sec-
retary Brown is much broader than the database market alone.  A recent state-
ment of the Co-Chair on High Performance Computing and Communications 
valued the “information technology” sector at $500 billion.  Prepared Statement on 
Evolving the High Performance Computing and Communications Initiative to Support 
the Nation’s Information Infrastructure:  Testimony Before the Science Subcomm. on 
Basic Research High Performance Computing and Communications Program of the 
House Committee on High Performance Computing and Communications, 104th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1995) (prepared statement of Ivan E. Sutherland, Ph.D., Co-Chair, 
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Yet, in most of the world, these valuable business tools3 
stand virtually naked in the marketplace,4 vulnerable to 
                                                                                                                                  
Committee on High Performance Computing and Communications, and Vice-
President, Sun Microsystems).  When the European Community (“EC”) penned 
its Initial Proposal for the legal protection of databases in 1992, the EC database 
market was estimated at $10.2 billion, which amounted to approximately 30% of 
the world market.  W. Joseph Melnik, A Comparative Analysis for the Legal Protec-
tion of Computerized Databases:  NAFTA vs. The European Communities, 26 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 57, 59 n.14 (1994). 
3. See supra note 2 (discussing the dollar value of the information technology 
market); J. H. Reichman, Electronic Information Tools:  The Outer Edge of World In-
tellectual Property Law, 17 DAYTON L. REV. 797, 806 n.45 (1992); Database Directive, 
supra note 1, recital 9, O.J. L 77/20, at 20 (1996) (“databases are a vital tool in the 
development of an information market within the Community”); WIPO Proposal, 
supra note 1, Preamble WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996) (“databases 
are . . . an essential tool for promoting economic, cultural, and technological ad-
vancement”); see also 142 CONG. REC. E890-04 (daily ed. May 23, 1996) (statement 
of Sen. Moorhead) (“[D]atabases are an essential tool for improving productivity, 
advancing education and training, . . .  creating a more informed citizenry[, 
and] . . . are also the linchpin of a dynamic commercial industry in the United 
States.”). 
4. Databases, like most forms of intellectual property, are saddled with 
“public goods” characteristics:  they are indivisible, inexhaustible, and ubiqui-
tous.  See, e.g., J. H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichot-
omy:  Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property System, 13 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475, 486 (1995); see also J. H. Reichman & Pamela Sam-
uelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 59 n.35 (1997); see 
infra notes 5, 8-10 and accompanying text (discussing vulnerability of databases).  
Practically speaking, this means that without some legal protection, parasitic 
competitors can access, copy, rearrange, and market a competing database at a 
fraction of the cost incurred by the original database maker.  COMM. ON ISSUES IN 
THE TRANSBORDER FLOW OF SCIENTIFIC DATA, U.S. NAT’L COMM. FOR CODATA, 
COMM’N ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICS, AND APPLICATIONS, AND NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, BITS OF POWER:  ISSUES IN GLOBAL ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC DATA 
1-52 (National Academy Press forthcoming 1997) [hereinafter GLOBAL ACCESS].  
Although database makers can erect technological fences to protect their invest-
ments (e.g., encryption algorithms), those fences suffer limitations which render 
them less than optimal as a means of protection.  See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr., 
Property and Innovation in the Global Information Infrastructure, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 261, 288 (1996) (discussing market, technological, and legal limitations as tools 
to protect intellectual property on the Internet).  In addition, useable encryption 
technology forces only the first purchaser to pay for a key to decrypt the encoded 
information.  Therefore, unless there is a fence, or other disincentive to prevent 
the first purchaser from repackaging the database maker’s investment, 
encryption suffers the same weakness as the two-party deal discussed infra in 
Part I. 
 
 
 
 
 
702 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [7:697 
 
parasitic competitors, users, and information Samaritans,5 
unless the database maker renders the database less valu-
able, or more expensive,6 to the information user by crea-
tively “selecting and arranging” enough disparate data to 
erect the fence7 afforded by copyright,8 erects the two-party 
 
5. Information Samaritans refers to parties who, for noneconomic reasons, 
extract data from databases without paying the database maker and make it 
freely available to the public.  Cf. United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 
536 (D. Mass. 1994).  In LaMacchia, a federal grand jury indicted LaMacchia, a 21-
year-old M.I.T. student, for devising a scheme in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 
(West Supp. 1996), the wire fraud statute, to defraud software manufacturers and 
vendors.  Id.  LaMacchia encouraged users to upload popular software and 
games to an electronic bulletin he named Cynosure, and transferred the pro-
grams to a second location where users with access to the Cynosure password 
could freely download the programs.  Id.  Because LaMacchia had apparently not 
acted for the purposes of securing “commercial advantage or private financial 
gain,” he could not be prosecuted under the criminal copyright statute, 17 
U.S.C.A. § 506 (West Supp. 1996).  Id. at 545; see also Copyright Law of the United 
States of America, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (current version at 17 
U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810 (West Supp. 1996)).  Citing, among other factors, the failure 
to allege violation of the criminal copyright statute, id. at 542-43, and relying 
heavily on the reasoning of Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985), the dis-
trict court granted LaMacchia’s motion to dismiss, but nonetheless noted that if 
the indictment was true, LaMacchia’s behavior was “at best heedlessly irrespon-
sible, and at worst . . . nihilistic, self-indulgent, and lacking in any fundamental 
sense of values.”  LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 545.  This Article does not discuss 
the conflicting policies presented by criminal prosecution of information Samari-
tans.  See Teddy C. Kim, Taming the Electronic Frontier:  Software Copyright Protec-
tion in the Wake of United States v. LaMacchia, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1255 (1996) (argu-
ing that criminal prosecution of noncommercial copyright infringers is 
inappropriate).  However, this Article does proceed on the assumption that ex-
tracting data from databases and making it freely available, regardless of the mo-
tive for such behavior, destroys incentives to invest in database creation.  See 
GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 8. 
6. For example, to secure copyright protection, many database makers inject 
“value-added” data, which increases the price of the database to the information 
user without any corresponding increase in utility.  See Jane C. Ginsburg, No 
“Sweat”? Copyright & Other Protection Works of Information, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 
344-47 (1992).  The additional data adds “value” only in the sense that it enables 
the database maker to secure some degree of copyright protection.  Id. at 347. 
7. Cf. Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner’s Dilemma in 
Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, 855 (1992) (noting that the right to 
exclude afforded authors functions much in the same way as fences do for real 
property owners). 
8. Copyright generally protects only the creative selection and arrangement 
of factual information.  See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
 
 
 
 
 
1997] EUROPEAN DATABASE DIRECTIVE 703 
 
wall afforded by contract,9 or is otherwise able to secure the 
haphazard protection whimsically afforded by unfair com-
petition law.10 
                                                                                                                                  
Artistic Works of September 9, 1886, completed at Paris on May 4, 1896, revised 
at Berlin on Nov. 13, 1908, completed at Berne on Mar. 20, 1914, revised at Rome 
on June 2, 1928, revised at Brussels on June 26, 1948, and revised at Stockholm on 
July 14, 1967 (with Protocol regarding developing countries), completed at 
Stockholm on July 14, 1967, art. 2(5), 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Conven-
tion] (protecting collections of works, which by reason of selection and arrange-
ment of their contents, constitute intellectual creations); 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 103 
(West Supp. 1996) (protecting compilations of data that are selected, coordinated, 
or arranged in such a way that the compilation constitutes an original work of 
authorship).  With regard to copyright protection, the Database Directive is in 
accord.  See Database Directive, supra note 1, recitals 15-16, O.J. L 77/20, at 21, 
art. 3(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996) (databases, which by reason of selection or ar-
rangement of their contents constitute intellectual creations, shall be protected by 
copyright); Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring 
Rights Questions, Draft Treaty on New Copyright Developments, art. 5 WIPO 
Doc. CRNR/DC/89 (Dec. 20, 1996) (compilations of data, which by reason of se-
lection or arrangement of their contents, constitute intellectual creations are pro-
tected), adopted by Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring 
Rights Questions, Geneva, Dec. 20, 1996; see also J. H. Reichman, Universal Mini-
mum Standards of Intellectual Property Under the TRIPs Component of the WTO 
Agreement, 29 INT’L LAW. 345, 373 (1995) (noting that the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) fails to offer the protec-
tion provided by the Database Directive’s sui generis regime).  But see Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act, 1988, 2 Eliz. 2, ch. 48, §§ 2-3 (Eng.) (protecting “sweat of 
the brow” databases in the United Kingdom); Reichman, supra note 3, at 804 n.33 
(citing W. R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, 
TRADEMARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 268-69 (2d ed. 1989) for the United Kingdom’s 
practice of extending copyright to small change literary productions provided 
they exhibit “skill, judgment, and labor”); see also Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 372 
n.161 (noting that the Nordic Catalogue Rule provides protection to unoriginal 
compilations for 10 years).  The Database Directive permits derogation from its 
terms so that databases protected under less-exacting EC copyright regimes on 
the Database Directive’s effective date will continue to enjoy that protection until 
their term expires.  Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 14(2), O.J. L 77/20, at 27 
(1996); cf. WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 7(3) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 
30, 1996) (rights granted by treaty are independent of any protection afforded to 
the database maker by national legislation).  Similarly, the sui generis rights 
granted by the three regimes are without prejudice to any other rights.  See Data-
base Directive, supra note 1, art. 13, O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996); H.R. REP. NO. 3531, 
supra note 1, § 9 (c); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 10(2) WIPO Doc. 
CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996). 
9. See generally JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 4, 9 (3d 
ed. 1987). 
10. J. H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 
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Recognizing the need for a “stable and uniform legal pro-
tection regime” to stimulate database creation in the Euro-
pean Community (“EC”),11 the EC struck out boldly by erect-
ing a toll fence12 to protect the investment of database 
                                                                                                                                  
94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2476 (1994) (noting that the development of unfair com-
petition proceeds on a “hit-or-miss basis that varies with the outlook of single 
judges . . . [without any] well-defined objects of protection, . . . standards of eli-
gibility, and [with] few safeguards to protect the interests of all concerned”). 
11. Database Directive, supra note 1, recital 12, O.J. L 77/20, at 20 (1996).  
The United States’ share of the database market is approximately twice the EC’s 
market share.  See Explanatory Statement at COM(92)24 final-SYN 393 accompa-
nying the Council Directive Initial Proposal, art. 8, O.J. C 156/03, at 9 (1992) 
[hereinafter Initial Proposal]; see also Debra B. Rosler, The European Union’s Pro-
posed Directive for the Legal Protection of Databases:  A New Threat to the Free Flow of 
Information, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 105, 109-10 (1995) (explaining that Great Britain 
garners approximately 65% of the revenues from the EC database market).  Is it 
merely a coincidence that the two countries with the biggest database market 
share, the United States and Great Britain, have historically protected “noncrea-
tive” labors of database makers through “sweat of the brow” and “industrious 
collection” rationales?  See Pamela Samuelson, Missing Foundations of The Pro-
posed European Database Directive (1994) (on file with Professor Jerome H. 
Reichman, Vanderbilt University School of Law).  For a comparison of the two 
rationales, compare Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value:  Copyright 
Protection for Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865 (1990) (discussing 
United States “sweat of the brow” rationale) with Colin Tapper, An Aspect of 
Copyright in Data Bases, 14 N. KY. L. REV. 169 (1987) (explaining Great Britain’s 
“industrious collection” rationale).  But see Mark Powell, The European Union’s 
Database Directive:  An International Antidote to the Side-Effects of Feist?, in 3 
FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW & POLICY (Hugh C. Han-
sen ed., forthcoming 1997) (citing the European Parliament’s Committee on Eco-
nomic and Monetary Affairs opinion that “the economic situation in the database 
sector is such that urgent actions are not as yet required”). 
12. Cf. Gordon, supra note 7, at 855.  Gordon argues that groups seeking new 
fences “should be prepared to show that their current fences are inadequate to 
provide adequate incentives.”  Id.  To justify their need for a new fence, database 
makers need only point to Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 
U.S. 340 (1991), and its implications.  See Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 343 
(“Feist . . . calls into question the ability of copyright . . . to secure meaningful 
coverage to those compilations that do meet the initial test of copyrightablity.”).  
In Feist, the United States Supreme Court cloaked free riders who appropriate 
the “noncreative” labors of data collectors with constitutional protection by en-
dorsing the thin copyright doctrine.  Feist, 499 U.S. at 357-59.  Apparently, only 
the creative selection and arrangement of facts deserve copyright protection.  
Unfortunately, for many database makers, the exercise of creativity in the selec-
tion and arrangement of data is constrained by societal expectations, notions of 
functionality, and “user-friendliness” considerations.  See Ginsburg, supra note 6, 
at 343; Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts:  A Theory for the Protec-
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makers.13  Emboldened by, or perhaps scurrying to catch up 
with,14 the vanguard approach15 embodied in the EC’s Data-
base Directive,16 the United States and the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (“WIPO”) have proposed similar pro-
tection for these valuable business tools.17  Like the Database 
Directive, the United States and WIPO proposals (“Propos-
als”), respectively known as the Database Investment and In-
tellectual Property and Antipiracy Act of 1996 (“H.R. 3531” 
or “U.S. Proposal”)18 and the Draft Treaty on Intellectual 
                                                                                                                                  
tion of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLO. L. REV. 516, 527-30 (1981). 
13. The Database Directive extends copyright protection to “authors” of da-
tabases, Database Directive, supra note 1, arts. 3-5, O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996), but 
extends sui generis protection to a broader group:  database makers.  Id. art. 7(1), 
O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996).  The Database Directive defines database makers as 
those who take the “initiative and risk of investing.”  Id. recital 41, O.J. L 77/20, 
at 23 (1996).  Unlike the Database Directive, which leaves ownership of em-
ployee-made databases up to national legislation, see id. recital 29, O.J. L 77/20, 
at 22 (1996), both the U.S. and WIPO Proposals define database maker in such a 
way as to preclude employees and subcontractors from gaining ownership 
rights.  See H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2; WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 
2(3) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996) (database maker is the person with 
control and responsibility for the undertaking of a substantial investment).  This 
Article does not address the copyright protection afforded database makers by 
the Database Directive.  Id. art. 7(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996). 
14. See Paul Waterschoot, An Overview of Recent Developments in Intellectual 
Property in the European Union, in 3 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW & POLICY, supra note 11 (explaining that the Database Directive 
“has placed the Community far ahead of its partners”); 142 CONG. REC. E890-04 
(daily ed. May 23, 1996) (statement of Sen. Moorhead) (explaining that the “Di-
rective could place U.S. firms at an enormous competitive disadvantage 
throughout the entire European market”). 
15. See Powell, supra note 11, at 50 n.2 (noting that the EC’s “vanguard ap-
proach to the legal protection of databases” parallels the United States’ adoption 
of a sui generis regime, the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (1984) (codified as amended at § 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-914 
(West Supp. 1996)), to protect semiconductors). 
16. Council Directive No. 96/9, O.J. L 77/20 (1996).  The Database Directive 
can be logically divided into three sections:  Articles 3-6 govern the copy-
rightability of databases; Articles 7-11 govern the sui generis extraction and reuti-
lization rights; and Articles 1, 2, and 12-16 are common provisions applicable to 
both bundles of rights.  See generally Council Directive No. 96/9, O.J. L 77/20 
(1996).  This Article does not address the copyright provisions of the Database 
Directive. 
17. See supra note 1-2. 
18. H.R. REP. NO. 3531, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). 
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Property in Respect of Databases (“WIPO Proposal”),19 
would create sui generis regimes20 protecting investment, as 
such, in databases. 
Some commentators argue that the Database Directive, 
and the Proposals it has spawned, are arguably the “most 
deviant” examples of the trend toward sui generis protection 
for intellectual property falling between the cracks of the 
mature paradigms of patent and copyright.21  These com-
mentators also argue that the Database Directive is “one of 
the least balanced and most potentially anti-competitive in-
tellectual property [regimes] ever created,”22 and join others 
who argue that the Database Directive will stifle access to in-
formation, retard competition in the database industry, and 
impede basic scientific research.23 
This Article argues that the Database Directive’s sui 
generis regime, at least with respect to publicly or privately-
 
19. Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights 
Questions, Draft Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Databases, WIPO 
Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996). 
20. Intellectual property laws protecting subject matter outside the scope of 
the mature intellectual property paradigms of patent and copyright law are 
commonly deemed “sui generis.”  See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 6 
n.6 (citations omitted).  Sui generis literally means “of its own class.”  See BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1434 (6th ed. 1990). 
21. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 53-54; see generally 
Reichman, supra note 10, at 2453-99 (discussing legal regimes protecting intellec-
tual property falling between the cracks of the mature patent and copyright 
paradigms); Reichman, supra note 4, at 517 (suggesting the need for a new intel-
lectual property paradigm, not based upon exclusive property rights, that “looks 
beyond art and inventions . . . [and] deal[s] directly with the pervasive threat of 
market failure facing investors in unpatentable, noncopyrightable innovation”). 
22. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 79. 
23. See Rosler, supra note 11, at 146; Charles Von Simson, Feist or Famine:  
American Database Copyright as an Economic Model for the European Union, 20 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 729, 766-68 (1995); Letter from Bruce Alberts et al., President, 
National Academy of Sciences, to Michael Kantor, Secretary of Commerce (Oct. 
9, 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter “Academy Letter”]; Reichman & 
Samuelson, supra note 4, at 55; GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 35.  “Basic re-
search” seeks to further scientific knowledge for its own sake, without regard to 
specific applications.  See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE & ENGINEERING 
INDICATORS 4-9 (15th ed. 1996). 
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available data (“nonproprietary data”),24 serves some of the 
same procompetitive functions as does the law of trade se-
crets25 without requiring secrecy.26  While this Article recog-
nizes that the Database Directive’s sui generis regime could 
result in de facto “fact monopolies,” or otherwise enable da-
tabase makers to charge monopoly rents for sole-source or 
proprietary data,27 this Article argues that ameliorative 
measures available in the EC are sufficient to enable compe-
tition, the ultimate guardian of consumers in market econo-
mies,28 to perform its protective role in the EC, even in the 
case of sole-source data.  However, the lack of an interna-
tional competition law or other international sword,29 which 
 
24. Nonproprietary data are data that can be independently generated, col-
lected, or obtained from more than one source.  Compare Initial Proposal, supra 
note 11, art. 8, O.J. C 156/03, at 9 (1992) with Council Directive Amended Pro-
posal, art. 11, O.J. C 308/01, at 13-14 (1993) [hereinafter Amended Proposal] (de-
fining “sole-source data” as data that cannot be “independently created, collected 
or obtained from any other source”). 
25. See ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454-55 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing 
Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991)); cf. 
Reichman, supra note 10, at 2439-40. 
26. Under the Database Directive, second comers seeking to extract data 
from a protected database must either obtain a license from the database maker 
to extract the data, or independently generate the data.  See infra notes 244-54 and 
accompanying text; cf. Reichman, supra note 10, at 2438-40 (noting that trade se-
cret laws force second comers to license unpatentable know-how or to obtain the 
know-how by proper means); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 
(1974) (noting that trade secret law does not forbid independent creation, reverse 
engineering, or other fair and honest means). 
27. See supra note 24 (defining “nonproprietary data”). 
28. As the Supreme Court has explained:  “Basic to the faith that a free 
economy best promotes the public wealth is that goods must stand the cold test 
of competition; that the public, acting through the market’s impersonal judg-
ment, shall allocate the Nation’s resources and thus direct the course its eco-
nomic development will take . . . .”  Jefferson Parrish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 
12 (1984) (quoting Time-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 
605 (1953)); see also Digital Equip. v. Uniq Digital Technologies, 73 F.3d 756, 762 
(7th Cir. 1996) (“Competition among manufacturers fully protects buyers who 
accurately calculate life-cycle costs.”); cf. Rockwell Graphic Sys., 925 F.2d. at 180 
(discussing importance of trade secrets to preserve competition in intellectual 
property); Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d at 1453 (“Competition among vendors . . . is how 
consumers are protected in a market economy.”). 
29. See Eleanor M. Fox, Trade, Competition, and Intellectual Property—TRIPS 
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would enable fair followers30 to compete directly, or indi-
rectly with sole-source database makers in value-added 
markets, suggests a need to build a limitation into any inter-
national sui generis regime protecting investment in data-
bases.31 
This Article discusses and analyzes the EC Database Di-
rective’s sui generis regime,32 which, unlike copyright law, 
casts its protection based upon economic principles, rather 
than broad cultural policies.33  Part I examines briefly the 
general characteristics of the database markets and the pro-
tection afforded databases by existing legal regimes.  Part II 
compares the substantive provisions of the Database Direc-
tive and the Proposals.  Part III analyzes the Database Direc-
tive’s sui generis regime, using the factual background of 
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,34 a case whose facts demonstrate 
the vulnerability of databases to parasitic behavior, and con-
cludes that the Directive adequately balances the public’s 
need for information access with the need for production in-
centives within the EC. 
                                                                                                                                  
and its Antitrust Counterparts, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 481, 485-91 (1996) (dis-
cussing the significant differences in the world’s two prominent competition law 
systems:  European community competition law and United States antitrust 
law).  For an analysis of the interaction between EC competition law and intellec-
tual property law, see Jan Corbet, The Law of the EEC and Intellectual Property, 13 
J.L. & COM. 327 (1994). 
30. Cf. J. R. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers:  Global Competition 
Under the TRIPS Agreement, N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. (forthcoming 1997). 
31. See infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
32. See supra notes 1, 16. 
33. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
429 (1984) (explaining that copyright law makes economic reward secondary to 
the higher public purpose of providing the public access to the author’s creative 
genius) (citations omitted); see also Reichman, supra note 10, at 2452-53 (noting 
that copyright promotes cultural policies at the expense of efficient allocation of 
resources); see also Pamela Samuelson, Comments on Gerald Dworkin’s Article on 
Copyright, Patent or Protection for Computer Programs, in 1 FORDHAM INTERNA-
TIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW & POLICY 183 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 1996) 
(noting that the Database Directive is based upon “competition policy, rather 
than on the . . . Romantic concepts of authorship embedded in . . . Continental 
European [copyright]”). 
34. 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev’d, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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Part IV argues that the Database Directive’s sui generis 
regime would, if modified by incorporating a compulsory li-
cense35 loosely modeled on the compulsory license United 
States copyright mandates for musical works,36 provide a 
sufficiently pro-competitive international model to protect 
the public’s interest in competition in the information mar-
ket.  So modified, the Database Directive’s sui generis regime 
would permit fair followers to follow by honest means, 
while protecting the “sweat of the brow” intellectual efforts37 
and investments of database makers.  Part IV then discusses 
the risks and opportunities to researchers who currently op-
erate in noncompetitive, information-subsidized environ-
ments.  Finally, this Article concludes by suggesting that a 
sui generis regime protecting investment in databases could 
 
35. See Initial Proposal, supra note 11, art. 8, O.J. C 156/03, at 9 (1992); 
Amended Proposal, supra note 24, art. 11, O.J. C 308/01, at 13-14 (1993) (mandat-
ing compulsory licenses on “fair and nondiscriminatory terms” in the case of 
sole-source data); cf. Reichman, supra note 10, at 2539-44 (proposing off-the-rack 
liability regime with built-in compulsory license); see also Pamela Samuelson et 
al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection Of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2308 (1994); cf. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 81 (proposing short 
period of pro-competitive lead-time followed by an automatic license). 
36. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 115. 
37. Notwithstanding Feist’s epistemologically erroneous incantation that 
facts merely exist and await discovery, and therefore cannot be original, Feist, 
499 U.S. at 347-48, the author’s contributions are no more original than the re-
searcher’s contributions:  both translate and recombine data from the public do-
main.  See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1016 (1990) (argu-
ing that facts do not exist until researchers “sift through available evidence, 
design new avenues of inquiry, choose among a myriad of conflicting indicia, 
and supply interpretive paradigms”); see also Wendy J. Gordon, Reality as Arti-
fact:  From Feist to Fair Use, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93 (1992); cf. Zechariah 
Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 511 (1945) 
(explaining that authors stand on the shoulders of the cultural giant).  The ana-
lytical soundness of this conceptual truism is demonstrated by the narrow scope 
afforded Feist.  See, e.g., CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, 
Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the selection and arrangement of 
used car valuations was creative), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 72 (1995); Key Publica-
tions v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing that the selection of businesses to be included in a telephone directory was 
creative); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that 
the selection of categories in creating a baseball pitching form was creative). 
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effect a subtle, and perhaps favorable, shift in societal re-
sources from the pursuit of entertainment to the pursuit of 
knowledge. 
I. DATABASE PROTECTION UNDER EXISTING LEGAL REGIMES 
Although most databases find some degree of protection 
under the veil of copyright law, between the two-party wall 
afforded by contract, or within the whimsical embrace of un-
fair competition law, many commentators agree that these 
legal regimes, both singularly and collectively, fail to pro-
vide protection adequate to ensure the certainty of return on 
investment required to enhance and stimulate worldwide 
production of databases.38  To reveal the gap-filling func-
 
38. See, e.g., Statement on the NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995:  Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1997) (statement of Barbara A. Munder, Senior Vice 
President, McGraw-Hill Companies, testifying on behalf of the Information In-
dustry Association “IIA”) (“Information is literally and figuratively at the heart 
of the National Information Infrastructure. . . .”); id. (“[W]ithout effective protec-
tion, [producers of information content] cannot risk . . . investment in cyberspace 
where it is so easy to copy, retransmit and alter our property without our per-
mission, and often without our knowledge.”).  The Information Industry Asso-
ciation is a trade association of 550 companies that provides information prod-
ucts and services on a worldwide basis.  See Bradford L. Smith, Creating the Global 
Information Society:  Looking Ahead, in 2 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW & POLICY (Hugh C. Hansen ed., forthcoming 1997); Reichman & 
Samuelson, supra note 4, at 7; Denicola, supra note 12, at 528-30; Ginsburg, supra 
note 6, at 340-42; Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright in Electronic Maps, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 
395, 396 (1995) (arguing that a new approach, which may require either amend-
ing the Copyright Act or adopting a sui generis database protection statute, is 
needed to protect electronic maps); see also Database Directive, supra note 1, re-
cital 12, O.J. L 77/20, at 20 (1996); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, Note 1.05 WIPO 
Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996) (“[C]ontinued investment . . . in the develop-
ment and refinement of databases . . . will not take place unless a stable and uni-
form regime of legal protection is established . . . .”); cf. 142 CONG. REC. E890-04 
(daily ed. May 23, 1996) (statement of Sen. Moorhead) (introducing H.R. 3531 to 
“encourage continued investment in the production and distribution of valuable 
new databases”); cf. Rosler, supra note 11, at 107 (the inherent vulnerability of 
electronic databases amplifies the need for economic protection while preserving 
the “free flow of information”); Dennis S. Karjala, Misappropriation as a Third Intel-
lectual Property Paradigm, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2594, 2595 (1994) [hereinafter Karjala 
II] (suggesting a new approach to prohibit methods of acquiring information 
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tions that could be served by a sui generis regime designed to 
protect the investments of database makers, this part briefly 
examines various “database markets.”  This part then ex-
plores the relative strengths and weaknesses of existing legal 
regimes that afford some protection to these valuable busi-
ness tools. 
A. General Characteristics of the Splintered Database Markets 
Databases, and their respective commercial markets, vary 
as much as the needs and capabilities of the information 
consumers patronizing the database market.39  Although the 
commercial “database market” is difficult to define, the 
competitive battle for the information user’s patronage ap-
pears to be waged in at least three somewhat distinct, but 
overlapping, markets:  the “one-stop-shopping” market; the 
“problem-focused” market; and the “industry-focused” mar-
ket.40 
                                                                                                                                  
which, if permitted, would result in disincentives to create desirable works).  The 
failure of existing legal regimes to adequately protect database makers can be 
partially attributed to the peculiar characteristics of information:  “a commod-
ity . . . particularly embarrassing for the achievement of optimal allocation.”  See 
W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 831-32 (2d ed. 
1995) (quoting Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources 
to Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 620 (National 
Bureau of Economic Research ed., 1962)).  That is, optimal information utilization 
occurs when information is free, while optimal information production occurs 
only when producers expect to appropriate the economic value of their invest-
ments.  Id. 
39. Databases range in size and complexity from the Internet, which is con-
ceptually a database, to the Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH), a compilation 
of general and specific information relating to health care law, available in paper 
and electronic form, to simple tables of information. 
40. Lloyd A. Fletcher, Searcher, INFO. TODAY, Sept. 1, 1995, available in West-
law, Allnewsplus File; Telephone Interview with Anne Griffith, Senior Research 
Analyst at the Software Publishers Association, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 8, 1996) 
[hereinafter “Griffith Interview”] (explaining that the database market consists of 
many niche markets).  Examples of databases serving the broader market include 
NEXIS (current and archived news and information) and ProQuest Direct (jour-
nals, newspapers, and dissertation abstracts).  FRED NEVIN, BUSINESS 
INFORMATION MARKETS 1999:  THE STRATEGIC OUTLOOK 67-77 (Lorraine Sileo et al. 
eds., 1996 COWLES/SIMBA INFORMATION).  Business databases generally fall in 
seven topical areas (listed in descending market share order):  financial (real-
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Database vendors in the “one-stop-shopping” market of-
fer general information content to a broad customer base.41  
In contrast, database vendors in the “problem-focused” mar-
ket offer specific information content, focused on particular 
problems, to industry-wide groups,42 while database ven-
dors in the “industry-focused” market offer both general and 
specific information content to specific industry and profes-
sional markets such as medical, legal, government, public re-
lations, and news.43 
Generally speaking, database vendors offering general 
information content serve a broad market and incur lower 
data collection costs, which permits those database vendors 
to charge lower fees while remaining competitive.44  Con-
versely, because database vendors offering highly special-
ized information content generally serve a narrower market 
and incur higher data collection costs, those database makers 
typically charge higher fees to earn a return on their invest-
ment.45  As a result, information users seeking specialized in-
                                                                                                                                  
time and historical), marketing, credit, research, market-specific, le-
gal/tax/public records, and general and business news.  Id. 
41. See Fletcher, supra note 40 (noting that even within the broader market 
each vendor has its own relative subject matter strengths). 
42. Id. (citing LEXIS/NEXIS and Knight-Ridder’s Business-Base as exam-
ples); see also NEVIN, supra note 40, at 72 (listing Telerate as a provider of a data-
base focusing on the price of government securities and bonds). 
43. Fletcher, supra note 40 (citing LEXIS/NEXIS’ AnswerPaks and KRI’s 
Science-Base as examples); see also NEVIN, supra note 40, at 75-76 (listing Equifax 
Insurance Information Services (insurance industry), T/SF Communications 
(trucking industry), and ARI Network Services (agriculture and environmental) 
as providers of market-specific databases). 
44. Griffith Interview, supra note 40; see also Perritt, supra note 4, at  
45. Griffith Interview, supra note 40 (noting other factors driving costs in 
specialized markets such as increased collection costs because data are not as 
widely available, and higher data maintenance costs associated with dynamic 
data).  the cost of originating intellectual prop-
erty can be expressed as:  
co = cc + cc + cm + cr where cc is the cost of creation, e.g. payments to 
the author; cc is the cost of . . . preparing the information for publica-
tion; cm is the cost of marketing, including promotional expenses, dis-
tribution costs and costs of billing and collecting; and cr is the cost of 
copying (reproduction). 
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formation will generally pay a higher price than information 
users seeking general information.46 
Information users also generally find pricing structure 
variations within each market segment.47  For example, sub-
scription models may charge a basic fee for unlimited ac-
cess,48 or a basic fee for a fixed level of access plus an addi-
tional time-based fee for access beyond the fixed level.49  
Transactional pricing models may charge based upon the 
number of searches performed or upon the volume of in-
formation retrieved or extracted.50  Other pricing models al-
low free public access to a certain amount of information, 
and restrict access to more specialized information to paid 
subscribers.51  Finally, some pricing models incorporate fea-
tures of both the subscription and transaction models52 and 
permit the information user to choose the pricing scheme 
that maximizes usability while minimizing costs.53 
                                                                                                                                  
Perritt, supra note 4, at  
46. Griffith Interview, supra note 40; Perritt, supra note 4, at  276  
47. See Perritt, supra note 4, at (describing various pricing options avail-
able through Westlaw). 
48. For example, CD-ROM subscriptions typically provide unlimited access 
to an optical disk, along with periodic updates, for a fixed fee; CCH CD-ROM 
and Online for Windows (CCH) offers the Medicare and Medicaid Guide along 
with various other health law materials on optical disk with monthly updates; 
and local Internet access providers, as well as some centralized dial-up services 
such as America Online, offer an option for purchasing unlimited access. 
49. Griffith Interview, supra note 40.  For example, the CCH product noted 
above offers access to an accompanying online service, charged on an hourly ba-
sis, that provides access to the latest health and tax law materials.  See supra note 
48. 
50. Id. 
51. For example, Environmental RouteNet, a service offered by Cambridge 
Scientific, focuses on environmental information. Routenet also engages in price 
discrimination:  individual users may access for $50 per month, while institu-
tional prices start at $8,000 per year for eight users.  See Paul Blake, Database Tra-
ditionals Get Caught Up in the Web, INFO. TODAY, Sept. 1, 1995, available in Westlaw, 
Allnewsplus File; see also United States Courts Southern District of Texas (visited 
May 6, 1997) <http://www.txs.uscourts.gov> (permitting free access to certain 
data via the Internet but imposing time-based fees via a stand alone BBS 
(PACER) for other data). 
52. Examples include LEXIS/NEXIS and Westlaw. 
53. Id.; see also John B. Kennedy & Shoshana R. Dweck, Publishers, Authors 
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Although variations in the database market structure and 
price models may reflect some degree of competition,54 
commentators have noted that the market operates at a 
suboptimal level because of the failure of existing legal re-
gimes to protect adequately the investment required to pro-
duce valuable, commercial databases.55 
B. Protection Afforded Database Makers by Existing Legal 
Regimes 
Database makers and rightholders56 seeking to market 
their databases can obtain some degree of protection from 
existing legal regimes.57  This section briefly explores, in 
                                                                                                                                  
Battle Over Electronic Rights, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 28, 1996, at C17 (noting that publish-
ers are experimenting with tiered subscriptions, per-article, and time-based pric-
ing mechanisms). 
54. But see Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 69 (noting that anecdotal 
evidence suggests that database markets are “almost universally characterized 
by a distinct absence of competition”).  While this proposition may be true of 
markets dominated by database makers who are also the sole source for the data 
sought, the pricing options available to customers seeking the same type of in-
formation, see supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text, the high level of merger 
and acquisition activity in the business database market, and falling operating 
margins, indicate some level of competition in the database market.  See NEVIN, 
supra note 40, at 81. 
55. See supra notes 5, 8; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 55 (noting 
that the risk of market failure tends to keep the production of information goods 
at suboptimal levels); see also Reichman, supra note 10, at 2491 (noting that copy-
right’s creativity requirement could “exclude many of the most commercially 
and scientifically important databases”). 
56. Rights under the three sui generis regimes initially vest in the database 
maker, but are freely transferable thereafter.  See Database Directive, supra note 1, 
art. 7(3), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 4(2) WIPO 
Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996); H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2 (defining 
“database owner”). 
57. Database makers not seeking to market their databases who also keep 
their databases confidential might obtain trade secret protection.  See, e.g., Mis-
sissippi Uniform Trade Secrets Act, MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-26-1 to -19 (1996); 
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-194, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996) (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1831-1839 (West Supp. 1996)) (making theft of trade secrets 
a federal crime); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW §§ 39-45 
(1995).  Database makers may also benefit from criminal laws designed to deter 
computer-related crime.  See Rosler, supra note 11, at 131 (stating that such laws 
have been enacted in 49 states). 
 
 
 
 
 
1997] EUROPEAN DATABASE DIRECTIVE 715 
 
turn, the strengths and weaknesses of copyright, contract, 
and unfair competition law, three regimes that offer some 
protection to databases published in the marketplace.58 
1. Protection Afforded by Copyright 
One might expect that copyright, an institution designed 
to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”59 
would embrace a form of intellectual property with the po-
tential to enhance access to, and increase the availability of, 
information.60  Indeed, databases whose final form exhibits 
creative selection and arrangement61 secure protection 
“against the world.”62  However, as courts and commenta-
tors have recognized, the protection afforded by copyright 
law to databases, except in a few European countries,63 con-
sists of little more than a thin veil that quickly unravels as 
content becomes more factual and necessary.64 
Some commentators have noted that creatively selecting 
and arranging a database may reduce data availability and 
accessibility.65  For example, creatively selecting data ex-
 
58. In addition, the so-called Nordic “catalogue rule” protects “catalogues, 
tables, and similar compilations in which a large number of particulars have 
been summarized, including databases, for ten years after first publication.”  See 
Reichman, supra note 10, at 2492-93 (quoting Gunnar Karnell, The Nordic Cata-
logue Rule, in PROTECTING WORKS OF FACT 67-68 (E. J. Dommering & P. B. Hugen-
holtz eds., 1991)) (internal quotes omitted). 
59. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
60. Paradoxically, this very purpose is often cited as the basis for limiting 
copyright in factual information.  See Feist, 499 U.S. at 354 (“Throughout history, 
copyright law has recognized a greater need to disseminate factual works . . . .”) 
(citation omitted). 
61. See supra note 8. 
62. See Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d at 1454. 
63. See supra note 8. 
64. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyrights’ Incentive Access Para-
digm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 567-71 (1996) (discussing copyright’s questionable 
premise that by limiting the scope of protection for necessary works, society will 
have greater access to such works); see supra notes 5, 12. 
65. See Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 347-49; Denicola, supra note 12, at 530; see 
supra note 38. 
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cludes potentially desirable information,66 while creatively 
arranging data, assuming arrangement is not functionally-
dictated, may frustrate information users.67  In addition, be-
cause many database makers add superfluous original, 
value-added data in an attempt to avail themselves of the 
cloak of copyright, the selection and arrangement criteria 
may increase the cost of databases without providing corre-
sponding gains to database users.68 
Other commentators have recognized that because copy-
right rests in a large degree upon broad cultural policies, and 
not upon general economic considerations, copyright is ill-
suited to protect functional business tools like databases that 
compete in the general market.69  That is, by linking the exis-
tence and degree of protection to the superficial final form of 
the product, rather than to total production costs, copyright 
fails to offer sufficient production incentives to encourage 
production of these valuable business tools,70 and effectively 
excludes “many of the most commercially and scientifically 
important databases.”71 
Copyright, then, leaves databases whose content is fac-
tual or necessary or is otherwise considered noncreative (es-
pecially comprehensive, electronic databases that defer 
 
66. See Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 344-45 (noting that the selection criterion 
discourages comprehensive data collections); see also Reichman, supra note 10, at 
2491. 
67. See Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 344-45.  Consequently, electronic database 
makers often forego imposition of selection and arrangement criteria in favor of 
permitting users to dynamically impose their own selection and arrangement 
criteria. Id. 
68. Id. at 344-46. 
69. Cf. Reichman, supra note 10, at 2452-53 (noting that copyright promotes 
certain cultural policies at the expense of economic efficiency); Reichman, supra 
note 3, at 806 n.45 (copyright deliberately subordinates the price-setting function 
of the market to broader cultural policies); see Denicola, supra note 12, at 516 (not-
ing that “the very vocabulary of copyright law is ill-suited to analyze property 
rights in works of nonfiction[,]” such as databases). 
70. See Denicola, supra note 12, at 530. 
71. See Reichman, supra note 10, at 2491 (creativity requirement could ex-
clude many of the most commercially and scientifically important databases). 
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completely to the information consumer’s judgment regard-
ing data arrangement and selection)72 exposed to parasitic 
competitors and information Samaritans who extract and re-
compile the raw, unfiltered data to produce competing 
products.73 
2. Protection Afforded by Contract 
Through mutually beneficial exchanges, contracts permit 
the private ordering of resources (risk-allocation) essential to 
the efficient functioning of a market economy.74  Database 
makers can obtain differing degrees of contractual protec-
tion, depending on whether they make the database publicly 
available or keep it under private control.75 
The limits of contractual protection for publicly-available 
databases are apparent after considering that unlike a copy-
right, which is enforceable against the world,76 a contract is 
enforceable only against the contracting parties.77  Thus, 
 
72. See Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 345 (computerized databases are designed 
to permit users to impose their own arrangement and selection criteria). 
73. See Reichman, supra note 10, at 2490-91.  Information Samaritans might 
distribute the data and effectively destroy a large portion of the maker’s market, 
while parasitic competitors (“pirates”) might compete head-to-head with the da-
tabase maker, or might produce and market a value-added product before the 
maker produces the product.  Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 67-68.  In 
the latter case, the pirate might capitalize on advantages otherwise held by the 
maker; e.g., established database makers have production facilities, managerial 
experience, distribution channels, and reputational advantages.  See Perritt, supra 
note 4, at 279 (noting some of the market-related phenomena which tend to re-
duce the pirate’s ability to compete head-to-head with the maker). 
74. See Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d at 1455 (citing American Airlines v. Wolens, 513 
U.S. 219, 115 S. Ct. 817, 824-26 (1995); see generally 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.3, at 153-54 n.1 (2d ed. 1990). 
75. See GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 7-8 (discussing relative vulnerabili-
ties of public and private databases).  As used herein, “publicly-available” means 
that the database or its contents are physically available to the public in paper or 
electronic form. 
76. See Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d at 1454. 
77. See generally JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS (3d ed. 
1987).  Although today’s technology permits preapproved computer-to-
computer transactions with no human interaction, Stewart I. Edelstein, Litigating 
in Cyberspace:  Contracts on the Internet, TRIAL, Oct. 1996, at 16, “effective contract 
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unless the database maker can restrict redistribution, or con-
trol access to the database contents through technological 
mechanisms, publicly-available databases are susceptible to 
extraction and redistribution by parasitic competitors and in-
formation Samaritans who are not parties to the contract.78 
On the other hand, privately-controlled databases—those 
databases to which access is restricted79—enable database 
makers to “track and charge for every instance of electronic 
access.”80  Although such a database maker can theoretically 
“reject the state-imposed cultural bargain”81 of copyright law 
and “impose monopoly prices and potentially oppressive 
terms on users,”82 there are several practical limits on her 
ability to do so. 
First, unless the database consists of sole-source data,83 
which in some cases could trigger antitrust scrutiny,84 the 
database maker faces the threat of market competition.  Sec-
ond, database makers who make their product available 
only through telecommunications devices necessarily limit 
their market to those with access to such devices.85 
                                                                                                                                  
protection for content . . . [providers] is . . . problematic” on open (public) sys-
tems like the World Wide Web because “the transaction costs of effective nego-
tiations are high.”  See Perritt, supra note 4, at 290-91. 
78. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 65-68 (discussing the vul-
nerability of publicly-available databases); see also supra note 5 (discussing and 
defining “information Samaritan”). 
79. For example, access could be restricted by limiting distribution to con-
tracting parties via an electronic bulletin board or by other technological means 
such as encryption devices.  See supra note 4  
80. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 70. 
81. Id. 
82. Id.  Note that the Database Directive voids contracts that violate certain 
user rights.  See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 15, O.J. L 77/20, at 27 
(1996); see also infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text. 
83. See supra note 24. 
84. See, e.g., John R. Wilke, FTC Charges ADP Formed a Monopoly in the Junk 
Business, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1996, at A4 (reporting that the Federal Trade 
Commission filed suit against ADP for allegedly forming an information mo-
nopoly); see infra notes 136, 201. 
85. For example, although the Internet operates in over 75 countries, it 
reaches only approximately 25 million people who access the Internet via ap-
proximately two million personal computers.  See Charles Clark, The Copyright 
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Third, contracts provide protection to databases, whether 
publicly-available or privately-controlled, only if the parties 
voluntarily abide by the contractual terms, or if the contrac-
tual terms are otherwise enforced by the judicial machin-
ery.86  Commercially-minded courts have recognized that 
enforcing private agreements is fundamental to market effi-
ciency and stability,87 and that the enforcement of private 
agreements respecting intellectual property serves the “same 
procompetitive functions as does the law of trade secrets.”88  
However, some courts have saddled the “unruly horse” of 
public policy89 and rejected the efforts of intellectual prop-
erty producers to protect by contract that which copyright 
fails to protect.90 
Contracts, then, leave databases exposed to parasitic 
competitors and information Samaritans not in privity of 
contract with the database maker,91 and to the risk that a 
particular court will, on public policy grounds, refuse to en-
force a private contractual agreement regarding databases.92 
3. Protection Afforded by Unfair Competition Law 
Database makers who fail to obtain adequate protection 
from copyright and contract can sometimes obtain protec-
tion from the misappropriation branch of unfair competition 
                                                                                                                                  
Environment for the Publisher in the Digital World 18 (visited May 11, 1997) 
<http://www.grainger.uiuc.edu/icsu/clark.htm>. 
86. See, e.g., 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 1.1, at 4 
n.1 (2d ed. 1990) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (“A con-
tract is a promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a rem-
edy . . . .”). 
87. American Airlines, 115 S. Ct. at 826. 
88. See Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d at 1455. 
89. See 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.2, at 8 n.1 
(2d ed. 1990) (quoting Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 
303 (1824)); cf. Zeidenberg 908 F. Supp. at 657-59. 
90. See, e.g., ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis.), rev’d, 86 
F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
91. Perritt, supra note 4, at 292 (“contract protection is unavailable except 
when privity of contract exists”). 
92. See supra notes 89-90. 
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law.93  The tort of misappropriation protects investors from 
the malcompetitive behavior of free-riding competitors.94 
Unfortunately, the aegis of unfair competition law ebbs 
and flows with the tide, a tide that follows not the moon, but 
the sub rosa principles held by individual judges.95  The re-
sulting unpredictability of the remedy renders unfair compe-
tition law less than an optimal means of protecting and 
stimulating investment in databases.96 
Unfair competition law, then, while affording some pro-
tection to database makers from malcompetitive free rid-
ers,97 does not protect database makers from information 
Samaritans,98 and does not, because of the uncertainty of a 
remedy, provide a predictable basis upon which to make an 
investment decision.99 
 
93. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (giving 
birth to the tort of misappropriation in the United States); Denicola, supra note 
12, at 517 n.7 (collecting cases). 
94. See C. Owen Paepke, An Economic Interpretation of the Misappropriation 
Doctrine:  Common Law Protection for Investments in Innovation, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 
55, 68-69 (1987) (describing three common elements as:  (1) investment by the 
plaintiff in creating a product; (2) use of that investment or product in competi-
tion with the plaintiff; and (3) commercial damage to the plaintiff); Reichman & 
Samuelson, supra note 4, at 132 (citing domestic and foreign authorities recogniz-
ing the tort); Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition Law § 38.  But see Gary 
Myers, The Restatement’s Rejection of the Misappropriation Tort:  A Victory for the 
Public Domain, 47 S.C. L. REV. 673, 678 (1996) (arguing that the Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition Law rejects the tort of misappropriation as an in-
dependent cause of action). 
95. See Reichman, supra note 10, at 2476. 
96. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 131; Paepke, supra note 94, at 68-
70 (noting that the tort lacks consistent formulation and application). 
97. Id.; see supra note 93 (citing INS and a source collecting cases following 
the INS rationale). 
98. But see Paepke, supra note 94, at 68-69 (noting that some courts have 
eliminated the element of competition); see generally RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. 
DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND OTHER TOPICS 
BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC WORKS 580-83 
(6th ed. 1995) (describing the reception and evolution of INS in the federal 
courts). 
99. See Samuelson, supra note 11, at 9 (noting that the drafters of the Initial 
Proposal regarded EC unfair competition law as insufficient to produce adequate 
incentives to invest in database production). 
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Thus, while the mosaic of these three legal regimes offers 
some protection to database makers from the malcompeti-
tive or parasitic behavior of competitors, users, and informa-
tion Samaritans, existing legal regimes, both singularly and 
collectively, leave database makers exposed to free riders 
who can market a competing product at a fraction of the da-
tabase maker’s cost,100 and to parasitic users and information 
Samaritans who can wreak similar havoc to the database 
maker’s investments.101  As a result, many commentators 
have recognized the need for additional protection to in-
crease incentives to produce databases, those valuable busi-
ness tools that place information at the fingertips of the 
world,102 without extinguishing competition, the ultimate 
guardian of consumers in market economies.103 
In response to this perceived need to vindicate the com-
petitive ethos in database markets, the EC adopted the Data-
 
100. A database maker’s production costs can be expressed as P = dC + dP + 
dM + dR, where (P) equals the sum of data collection, purchase, generation, and 
validation costs (dC); plus data compiling and presentation costs (dP); plus da-
tabase marketing, distribution, billing and collection costs (dM); plus database 
reproduction costs (dR).  See Perritt, supra note 4, at 277 (expressing the costs of 
an intellectual property originator).  A database pirate’s production costs can be 
expressed as p = dA + dT + dM + dR + dL; where (p) equals the sum of data ac-
quisition costs in copying from the database maker (dA); plus data transforma-
tion costs (dT); plus database marketing, distribution, billing and collection costs 
(dM); plus database reproduction costs (dR); plus legal liability costs (dL).  Id. 
(expressing the costs of an intellectual property pirate).  Assuming database 
marketing (dM) and reproduction (dR) costs are equal for the maker and the pi-
rate, the pirate cannot compete in the same market with the database maker on a 
price basis unless P > p, or dC + dP > dA + dT + dL.  See id.  However, as dis-
cussed above, head-to-head competition is not the only way a pirate can damage 
the maker’s investment.  See supra note 73. 
101. Id.; see also supra notes 45, 73 and accompanying text (discussing sus-
ceptibility of databases to information Samaritans). 
102. See supra note 38 and accompanying text; see generally Wendy J. 
Gordon, On Owning Information:  Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Im-
pulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 222-26 (1992) (describing a new tort of “malcompetitive 
copying” when defendants knowingly copy protected intangibles in markets ex-
hibiting asymmetrical market failure that damage the creator’s market interests 
without providing an equal value to the creator in the long run). 
103. See supra note 28. 
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base Directive,104 which prompted the United States and the 
World Intellectual Property Organization to advance similar 
proposals.105 
II. COMPARISON OF THE DATABASE DIRECTIVE WITH THE 
 PROPOSALS 
This part compares the U.S. and WIPO Proposals with 
the Database Directive (collectively referred to as “regimes”).  
While the WIPO Proposal generally tracks the Database Di-
rective, the U.S. Proposal, H.R. 3531, differs in several sig-
nificant respects.  The first apparent difference lies in the 
broader definition of “database” found in H.R. 3531.106 
A. Scope of Protection 
To understand the potential scope of protection afforded 
by the regimes, this section first compares the regimes’ defi-
nition of “database” and the operative terms which define 
and circumscribe the sui generis rights provided to database 
makers.107  This section then compares the protection af-
forded by the regimes to existing databases, and each re-
gime’s affect on existing rights and obligations. 
1. Database Defined 
The Database Directive and the WIPO Proposal define 
“database” as a collection of independent works, data or other 
materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way capa-
ble of being individually accessed by any means.108  In con-
trast, H.R. 3531 defines “database” as “a collection, assembly 
or compilation, in any form . . . of works, data or other mate-
 
104. See Database Directive, supra note 1, recital 1, O.J. L 77/20, at 20 (1996) 
(databases are not sufficiently protected in Member States). 
105. See supra notes 1, 14-20 and accompanying text. 
106. See H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2. 
107. See supra notes 13, 56. 
108. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 1(2), O.J. L 77/20, at 24 (1996); 
WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 2(1) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996). 
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rial, arranged in a systematic or methodical way.”109 
H.R. 3531’s failure to require works to be independent 
could sweep recordings of audiovisual, cinematographic, lit-
erary, or musical works under its protective cloak; works 
that the Database Directive and the WIPO Proposal ex-
pressly disclaim.110  Thus, initially, H.R. 3531 appears to de-
fine “database” more broadly than either the Database Direc-
tive or the WIPO Proposal. 
However, H.R. 3531, like the Database Directive and the 
WIPO Proposal, extends its initial cloak of protection only to 
databases that are the product of a quantitative or qualitative 
substantial investment of financial or other resources in the 
“collection, assembly, verification, organization or presenta-
tion” of the contents of a database.111  Therefore, although 
H.R. 3531 may initially define “database” more broadly than 
the Database Directive or the WIPO Proposal, the substantial 
investment requirement, assuming it is interpreted similarly 
under each regime,112 reduces the potential definitional dif-
ference.113 
 
109. See H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2. 
110. See Database Directive, supra note 1, recital 17, O.J. L 77/20, at 21 
(1996); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, Note 2.03 WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 
1996). 
111. See H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 3(a); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, 
art. 2(4) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996); cf. Database Directive, supra 
note 1, art. 7(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996) (substantial investment in the obtain-
ing, verification or presentation of database contents). 
112. With the exception of the disclaimer regarding audiovisual works 
noted above, neither the Database Directive nor the Proposals define “substantial 
investment.”  H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 3(a); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, 
art. 2(4) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996); cf. Database Directive, supra 
note 1, art. 7(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996). 
113. But see Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 98-99 (arguing that the 
definition in H.R. 3531 is so broad that it might cover noncopyrightable compo-
nents of computer programs and scientific or historical theories based on fact or 
data).  However, H.R. 3531 flatly excludes computer programs from the scope of 
its protection.  See H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 3(d) (“computer programs 
are not subject to this Act, including without limitation any computer programs 
used in the manufacture, production, operation or maintenance of a database”).  
Moreover, the argument that H.R. 3531 defines “database” broadly enough to 
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2. Sui Generis Rights Granted 
Assuming the database passes the substantial investment 
threshold, the database maker114 gains two complementary 
rights:  (1) the right to prohibit extraction of, and (2) the right 
to prohibit reutilization of (the Database Directive), or utili-
zation of (the WIPO Proposal), or use or reuse of (H.R. 3531), 
all or a substantial part of the database contents.115  Thus, to 
understand the breadth of the complementary rights, one 
must examine the definitions of “extraction,” “reutilization,” 
“utilization,”116 or “use” and “reuse,” as the case may be, and 
“substantial part.”117 
                                                                                                                                  
cover scientific or historical theories based on significant compilations of facts or 
data would apply equally to the Database Directive and the WIPO Proposal.  
With today’s digital technology, even three dimensional objects with appropriate 
sensing devices can be reduced to a series of ones and zeros that can be compiled 
and collected in a database that would find protection under each regime, pro-
vided the database meets the benchmark of protection—substantial investment.  
Although segments of scientific and historical theory, along with anything else 
(except computer programs) that can be reduced to a series of ones and zeros, 
can be compiled in database form and protected under either regime, the re-
gimes require the second comer only to obtain those ones and zeros from other 
sources, or from the database maker by fair and honest means, for example, by 
purchasing a license. 
114. See supra note 56. 
115. The maker or rightholder is afforded two powers characteristically as-
sociated with the bundle of rights deemed property:  the power to exclude and 
the power to transfer.  See generally Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-
Expression:  Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 
102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1546 (1993); Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(2), O.J. L 
77/20, at 26 (1996); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 2(2), (4) WIPO Doc. 
CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996) (defining “extraction” and “utilization”), art. 3(1) 
(granting the right to prohibit extraction or utilization); H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra 
note 1, § 4.  The regimes do not create de jure property rights in data.  See infra 
notes 211-13. 
116. Because the meaning of “utilization” as used in the WIPO Proposal is 
substantially the same as the terms “use” and “reuse” as used in U.S. Proposal, 
see infra note 122, for the reader’s and writer’s benefit, the term “utilization” is 
not referred to in the text hereinafter. 
117. The “depth” of the complementary rights (i.e., the liability of down-
stream “innocent users” who may unknowingly reuse database contents made 
available by an initial infringer) is not addressed by either regime.  However, 
knowledge is required to impose criminal liability under H.R. 3531.  See H.R. 
REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, §§ 8, 13. 
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a. The Extraction Right 
The Database Directive and the Proposals define “extrac-
tion” as “the permanent or temporary transfer of all or a sub-
stantial part of the contents of a database” to another me-
dium by any means or in any form.118  Although H.R. 3531 
explicitly extends the extraction right to copies of a data-
base,119 the extraction right provided by the Database Direc-
tive and the WIPO Proposal would also protect copies.120  
Thus, the regimes define the extraction right substantively 
the same. 
b. The Complementary Reutilization, or Use and 
Reuse, Right 
The Database Directive and the Proposals define the 
complementary reutilization or use right differently in sev-
eral respects.  First, the Database Directive grants a right to 
prohibit only reutilization,121 while the Proposals grant a 
right to prohibit use and reuse.122  Second, “reutilization” as 
defined by the Database Directive123 requires a positive act—
 
118. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(a), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 
(1996); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 2(2) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 
1996); H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2. 
119. See H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2. 
120. A copy necessarily requires transfer of the entire contents of a database, 
an act prohibited by each regime.  See supra note 115. 
121. The Database Directive defines “reutilization” as “any form of making 
available to the public all or a substantial part of the contents of a database by 
the distribution of copies, by renting, by online, or other forms of transmission.”  
See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(b), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996). 
122. See supra note 116.  The WIPO Proposal defines “utilization” as:  
[T]he making available to the public of all or a substantial part of the 
contents of a database by any means, including by the distribution of 
copies, by renting, or by online, or other forms of transmission, includ-
ing making the same available to the public at a place and at a time in-
dividually chosen by each member of the public. 
WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 2(6) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996).  
H.R. 3531 defines “use” and “reuse” as “making available all or a substantial 
part . . . of the contents of a database, or [providing] access [there]to.”  See H.R. 
REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2. 
123. See Database Directive, supra note 1, arts. 7(1), 7(2)(b), O.J. L 77/20, at 
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transmission—while “use” as defined by the Proposals could 
theoretically occur without a positive act.124  Thus, based 
solely on the definition of this complementary right, the 
Proposals grant the database maker a broader right. 
c. Breadth of the Sui Generis Rights 
As noted above,125 the breadth of the right to prevent ex-
traction and the right to prevent reutilization, or use and re-
use, is linked to the meaning of “substantial part.”126  Here, 
the WIPO Proposal diverges slightly, and H.R. 3531 diverges 
significantly, from the Database Directive. 
The WIPO Proposal defines “substantial part” as “any 
portion of the database, including an accumulation of small 
portions, that is of qualitative or quantitative significance to 
the value of a database.”127  The WIPO Proposal therefore 
provides more guidance to courts charged with interpreting 
it than does the Database Directive, which purposely left the 
definition of “substantial part” to the European Court of Jus-
tice.128  However, because the Database Directive specifically 
prohibits repeated and systematic extraction or reutilization 
of insubstantial parts of the contents of a database which 
conflict with the normal exploitation of the database or 
                                                                                                                                  
25, 26 (1996); supra note 120. 
124. See WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, arts. 2(6), 3(1) WIPO Doc. 
CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996) (prohibiting use by making available to the public 
at a time and place individually chosen by a member of the public); see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, §§ 2, 4(a)(1) (prohibiting use or reuse by providing 
access). 
125. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text (the rights to prevent ex-
traction and reutilization, or use and reuse, extends only to all or a substantial 
part of the database). 
126. See infra notes 127-30 (explaining the regimes’ differing definitions of 
substantial part). 
127. WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 2(5) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 
30, 1996). 
128. See Jens-L. Gaster, The New EU Directive Concerning the Legal Protection 
of Data Bases, in 3 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW & 
POLICY, supra note 11, at 4 (explaining that the Commission deliberately left the 
task of defining “substantial part” to the European Court of Justice). 
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which unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
database maker,129 a court could easily ascribe the same 
meaning to the term, whether interpreting the term as found 
in the WIPO Proposal or the Database Directive. 
H.R. 3531, in contrast, implicitly defines “substantial 
part” by defining “insubstantial part” as “any portion of the 
contents of a database whose extraction, use or reuse does 
not diminish the value of the database, conflict with a nor-
mal exploitation of the database or adversely affect the ac-
tual or potential market, for the database.”130  Although one 
could argue that the legitimate interests of the database 
maker could include the potential market, the Database Di-
rective prohibits only acts which “unreasonably prejudice” 
those legitimate interests,131 while H.R. 3531 broadly prohib-
its extractions, uses, and reuses that merely “adversely af-
fect” the actual or potential market.132  H.R. 3531 illustrates 
its protective sweep by providing examples of extractions, 
uses, and reuses of database contents that would constitute 
infringement.133 
Some commentators have suggested that the foregoing 
provisions of H.R. 3531, coupled with its severe criminal 
penalties,134 have the “potential for impeding virtually any 
 
129. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(5), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996). 
130. H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2 (emphasis supplied). 
131. See Database Directive, supra note 1, arts. 7(5), 8(2), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 
(1996). 
132. H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, §§ 2 (defining “insubstantial part”), 
4(a) (prohibited acts). 
133. Infringing acts include extraction, use, or reuse of all or a substantial 
part of the database contents:  (1) in a product or service directly or indirectly 
competing with a database from which it was extracted; (2) in a product or ser-
vice directly or indirectly competing in any market in which the database owner 
has a demonstrable interest or expectation in licensing or otherwise; (3) in a 
product or service for customers who might otherwise reasonably be expected to 
be customers for the database; or (4) in an organization, by or for multiple per-
sons within the organization, in lieu of an additional authorized use or reuse.  
H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 4(b). 
134. H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 8 (providing for a fine of $250,000 or 
imprisonment for five years, or both, for first-time offenders who willfully, and 
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judge made [‘fair use’] exceptions”135 and, more importantly, 
may cast a shadow on the availability of any pro-competitive 
“Magill-like”136 exceptions to the database maker’s “un-
bounded derivative work right.”137  Nevertheless, despite 
H.R. 3531’s potential breadth, it is narrower than the Data-
base Directive and the WIPO Proposal in two significant 
ways.138 
First, H.R. 3531 expressly withholds protection for data-
bases made by governmental entities, and by governmental 
                                                                                                                                  
for commercial advantage or who cause $10,000 damage to the database owner 
in one calendar year, violate the database owners sui generis rights).  The U.S. 
Proposal also provides a detailed set of civil remedies for violating the database 
makers’ extraction and reutilization rights.  See H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, 
§ 12 (providing injunctive relief, impoundment, actual damages or statutory 
damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees in certain cases, and treble damages against 
persons adjudged a violator of §§ 10 or 11 within the previous three years).  In 
contrast, violating the database makers’ extraction and reutilization rights under 
the Directive triggers “appropriate remedies.”  See Database Directive, supra note 
1, art. 12, O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996).  Under the WIPO Proposal, Contracting Par-
ties must provide “expeditious remedies to prevent infringements, and remedies 
that constitute a deterrent to further infringement.”  WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, 
art. 13 (Alternative B) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996); see also id. (Al-
ternative A incorporating the Annex). 
135. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 99. 
136. Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, Case 69/89, [1991] E.C.R. 485, 4 
C.M.L.R. 586 (Ct. First Instance); British Broadcasting Corp. v. Commission, Case 
70/89, [1991] E.C.R. 535, 4 C.M.L.R. 669 (Ct. First Instance); Independent Televi-
sion Publications Ltd. v. Commission, Case 76/89, [1991] E.C.R. 575, 4 C.M.L.R. 
775 (Ct. First Instance) (known collectively as “Magill”) (affirming a compulsory 
licensing order against a copyright holder who used the copyright to prevent a 
competitor from producing a value-added product (a television program guide); 
see also infra notes 276-92 and accompanying text (discussing other swords avail-
able in the EC). 
137. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 101. 
138. In addition, to the extent that the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, 
§ 8, cl.(3), retains any vitality, it places a jurisdictional limit on Congress’s ability 
to regulate databases.  Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidat-
ing Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as beyond Congress’s ability to regulate 
under the Commerce Clause).  Of course, any limit inherent in the Commerce 
Clause would not affect a properly executed treaty.  Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 
U.S. 416 (1920) (unless forbidden by the United States Constitution, the federal 
government can act in matters where a national interest exists that can only be 
protected by acting in concert with another nation). 
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agents in their official capacities.139  Second, H.R. 3531 insu-
lates information users from liability for the “use or reuse of 
database contents lawfully extracted from a database[] prior 
to the effective date of th[e] Act.”140 
3. Rights and Obligations in Existing Databases 
The Proposals diverge from the Database Directive in 
that the Proposals would sweep all existing databases under 
their cloaks of protection,141 while the Database Directive re-
quires protection of only those databases made after January 
1, 1983.142  The regimes converge in two respects.  First, each 
regime provides that the sui generis rights are without preju-
dice to other rights or obligations in a database or its con-
tents.143  Second, neither regime extends copyright-like pro-
tection to the contents of the database.  Instead, each regime 
requires users or potential competitors either to collect the 
information independently, or to pay the database maker for 
the collected information.144  In essence, the regimes imbue 
 
139. H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2.  However, H.R. 3531 does not ex-
clude databases merely because its contents have been obtained from a govern-
mental entity.  Id. § 3(c).  To accommodate this derogation, the WIPO Proposal 
makes the matter of protection granted to databases made by governmental en-
tity or their agents a matter for national legislation.  WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, 
art. 5(2) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996). 
140. H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 15 (providing that H.R. 3531 would 
become effective upon enactment).  In contrast, the WIPO Proposal permits 
adoption of a limited two-year window, during which time copies lawfully made 
of databases before the effective date of the treaty may be distributed to the pub-
lic, see WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 11(2), while the Database Directive pro-
vides only that its sui generis regime “shall be without prejudice to any acts con-
cluded and rights acquired” before the effective date.  Database Directive, supra 
note 1, art. 14(4), O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996). 
141. WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 11(1) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 
30, 1996); H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 15. 
142. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 14(3), O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996). 
143. Id. art. 13, O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996); H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 
9; WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 12 WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996). 
144. Database Directive, supra note 1, recital 45, O.J. L 77/20, at 23 (1996); 
WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, Note 3.02 WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996); 
H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 5(b). 
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databases with a portable toll fence.145 
B. Beneficiaries of Protection 
The Database Directive protects databases made by146 na-
tionals and habitual residents of Member States;147 by com-
panies and firms formed according to the law of a Member 
State and having their central administration or principal 
place of business within the EC;148 and by companies and 
firms having their registered office within the EC, provided 
the company or firm has a genuine economic link to a Mem-
ber State.149  The Database Directive also protects databases 
manufactured in third countries by agreement of the Council 
of the European Union (“Council”).150 
Similarly, the WIPO Proposal protects databases made by 
nationals and habitual residents of Contracting Parties;151 by 
companies, firms, and other legal entities having their cen-
tral administration or principal place of business within a 
 
145. See Gordon, supra note 7, at 855. 
146. “Databases made by” means “database maker” as that term is defined 
by the regimes.  See supra notes 13, 56. 
147. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 11(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996). 
148. Id. art. 11(2), O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996). 
149. Id. 
150. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 11(3), O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996).  
Unless eligible under one of the first three options, or unless the United States 
enacts a statutory scheme offering comparable protection, American database 
makers could not avail themselves of the sui generis regime because the final op-
tion requires third countries to provide comparable protection (material reciproc-
ity) to EC databases, Database Directive, supra note 1, recital 56, O.J. L 77/20, at 
24 (1996), and because Feist prohibits United States copyright law from extending 
comparable protection.  See supra note 12 (discussing the Feist decision).  Al-
though the material reciprocity requirement seemingly contravenes the most ba-
sic principle of the TRIPS agreement—national treatment—the Database Direc-
tive falls outside the TRIPS agreement.  See Council Common Position No. 95/20, 
Statement of the Council’s Reasons 19, O.J. C 288/02, at 28 (1995) [hereinafter 
Common Position] (sui generis right not linked to any existing international con-
vention); Reichman, supra note 8, at 347-51. 
151. See WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, arts. 6, 7(4) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 
(Aug. 30, 1996). 
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Contracting Party;152 and by companies, firms and other le-
gal entities having their registered office in the territory of a 
Contracting Party, provided its operations have a genuine 
and ongoing economic link to a Contracting Party.153  H.R. 
3531, in contrast, protects databases made by natural and ju-
ristic persons,154 but, as noted above,155 specifically excludes 
governmental entities and certain governmental agents in 
their official capacities.156 
C. Term of Protection 
Rather than providing a single initial term of protection, 
the regimes provide a two-stage initial term of protection.157  
The Database Directive and the WIPO Proposal, alternative 
B,158 provide a fifteen-year term of protection, plus an addi-
tional fifteen years if the database is made available to the 
public before expiration of the initial term.159  In contrast, 
 
152. See id. art. 6(2), WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996). 
153. Id.  Note, however, that unlike the Database Directive, which adopts a 
material reciprocity standard, see supra note 150, the WIPO Proposal adopts the 
standard of national treatment by requiring Contracting Parties to grant database 
makers who are nationals of other Contracting Parties the rights granted by the 
Treaty and other rights granted to the nationals of the Contracting Party.  See 
WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 7(1) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996). 
154. See H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2 (defining “juristic person” to 
exclude governmental entities). 
155. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
156. H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2. 
157. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 10(1)-(2), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 
(1996); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 8(1)-(2) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 
30, 1996); H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 6(a). 
158. See WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 8(1)-(2) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 
(Aug. 30, 1996) (alternative A provides a 25-year term, while alternative B pro-
vides a 15-year term). 
159. The initial and second terms begin on January 1 of the year following 
the date on which the database meets the requirements for protection, or is made 
available to the public.  See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 10(1)-(2), O.J. L 
77/20, at 26 (1996); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 8(1)-(2) WIPO Doc. 
CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996).  The Initial Proposal limited the term of protection 
to 10 years.  See Initial Proposal, supra note 11, art. 9(3), O.J. C 156/03, at 9 (1992).  
Apparently, the term of protection was increased to 15 years as a result of indus-
try lobbying.  See Suzanne Perry, Longer Protection in Database Directive Proposed, 
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H.R. 3531 provides a potentially perpetual initial term of 
protection,160 plus an additional twenty-five years from the 
earlier of the date the database is made available to the pub-
lic or is first placed in commercial use.161 
In addition to the initial two-stage term of protection, the 
regimes provide the database maker an opportunity to ex-
tend the toll fence perpetually.162  However, the Database 
Directive and the WIPO Proposal require the same showing 
to extend the fence as is required to erect the toll fence:  a 
substantial investment.163  In contrast, H.R. 3531 requires 
only a “change of commercial significance” to extend the 
fence perpetually.164 
D. Exceptions:  User Protections 
The regimes protect legitimate users by providing excep-
tions to, and placing limitations on, the sui generis rights.  For 
example, each regime avoids conferring a de jure monopoly 
                                                                                                                                  
REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP., Mar. 17, 1993, available in Westlaw, Allnewsplus 
File. 
160. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 6(a) (term of protection is 
triggered by placing in commercial use or making available to the public) with id. 
§ 3(b) (databases qualifying for protection under the act remain protected regard-
less of whether they are made available to the public or placed in commercial 
use). 
161. See id. § 6(a) (providing that databases remain subject to the act for 25 
years after January 1 of the year following the earlier of the date on which the 
database is made available to the public or placed in commercial use). 
162. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 10(3), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996); 
WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 8(3) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996); 
H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 6(b). 
163. One can argue that the Database Directive and the WIPO Proposal do 
not offer “renewal” options, but rather offer protection only for “new” databases 
because the same investment is required to extend protection as to obtain initial 
protection.  See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 10, O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996); 
WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, arts. 8(3), 10 WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 
1996). 
164. See H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, §§ 6(b), 2 (defining “change of 
commercial significance” as “a change that a reasonable user of a database would 
regard as affecting the quality, quantity or value” of the database contents as a 
whole). 
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on facts or information,165 and provides that all other laws 
regarding databases or their contents—chief among them for 
purposes of this Article, competition law and laws in respect 
to access to public documents—shall remain unaffected by 
the respective regime.166 
Additionally, the Database Directive and the WIPO Pro-
posal expressly permit Member States and Contracting Par-
ties, respectively, to enact limited “fair-use” exceptions.167  
H.R. 3531 does not expressly provide fair-use exceptions, but 
does follow the Database Directive in permitting lawful da-
tabase users to extract, use, and reuse insubstantial amounts 
of data for “any purposes whatsoever.”168  The Database Di-
rective strengthens this user protection by deeming contrac-
tual provisions to the contrary void,169 but qualifies the pro-
tection by prohibiting users from performing acts that either 
conflict with normal exploitation of the database or unrea-
sonably prejudice the database maker’s legitimate inter-
ests.170 
 In contrast, H.R. 3531 permits parties to contract 
 
165. However, in the case of sole-source data, the regimes could result in a 
de facto monopoly on facts.  See infra notes 262-70 and accompanying text. 
166. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 13, O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996); H.R. 
REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 9(c); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 12 WIPO Doc. 
CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996). 
167. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 9, O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996); 
WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 5(1) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996).  
In this respect, the WIPO Proposal would permit broader “fair-use” exceptions 
than the Database Directive.  Compare WIPO Proposal, art. 5(1) WIPO Doc. 
CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996) (permitting exceptions to and limitations on the 
extraction and use rights in special cases that do not conflict with the normal ex-
ploitation of the database and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate in-
terests of the database right-holder) with Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 9, 
O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996) (providing three specific enumerated exceptions which 
may be authorized by Member States).  The Database Directive’s exceptions are 
discussed more fully infra notes 294-321 and accompanying text. 
168. H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 5(a); Database Directive, supra note 1, 
art. 8(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996). 
169. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 15, O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996). 
170. Id. art. 8(1)-(2), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996). 
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around this potential user protection.171  H.R. 3531 also se-
verely limits “any purposes whatsoever”172 by prohibiting 
users from performing or procuring acts that singularly or 
cumulatively, adversely affect the actual or potential market 
for the database.173  Considering this limitation and others 
noted above,174 “one is hard pressed to imagine”175 a legiti-
mate purpose for which a user could extract or use even an 
insubstantial amount of data from a database protected by 
H.R. 3531 without the database maker’s authorization. 
E. The Proposals’ Provisions Regarding Protection-Defeating 
Devices and Database Management Information 
The Proposals prohibit the importation, manufacture, or 
distribution of devices whose primary purpose or effect is to 
defeat or circumvent self-protection measures176 taken by 
database makers to prevent unauthorized extractions and 
utilizations.177  Violation of this prohibition triggers “appro-
priate and effective remedies”178 under the WIPO Proposal, 
and triggers a detailed set of civil remedies under H.R. 
3531.179 
In addition, H.R. 3531 offers protection to database mak-
ers who mark their products with database management in-
 
171. See H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 9(b) (permitting parties to freely 
contract with regard to databases and their contents). 
172. See supra note 168. 
173. H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 4; see also supra notes 108-45 and ac-
companying notes (d  
174. See supra notes 108-45 and accompanying notes (
 
175. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 100. 
176. Such self-protection measures might include encryption or password-
protection systems. 
177. WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 10 WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 
1996); H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 10.  The Database Directive does not 
address protection-defeating devices. 
178. WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, art. 10(2) WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 
30, 1996). 
179. These are the same remedies triggered for violation of the extraction 
and use rights.  See supra note 134. 
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formation.180  Knowingly providing false database manage-
ment information, or knowingly altering or removing data-
base management information without authority of the da-
tabase maker, triggers both civil remedies and severe 
criminal penalties.181 
III. MAKING THE PARADIGMATIC SHIFT:  LINKING 
 INCENTIVES TO PRODUCTION COSTS 
To explain the implications of the Database Directive’s 
sui generis regime, this part182 analyzes the Database Direc-
tive in light of applicable EC law, using the factual back-
ground of a recent United States case, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeiden-
berg.183  This part also examines the balance the Database 
Directive strikes in the EC between the public’s need for in-
formation access and the database maker’s need for produc-
tion incentives.  Finally, this part responds to criticisms and 
concerns voiced by commentators.184 
Seeking to correct the imbalance of investment between 
the EC and the world, and between EC members in database 
production,185 the Database Directive seeks to harmonize ex-
isting European copyright law186 while simultaneously erect-
ing a renewable, potentially perpetual, fifteen-year toll 
 
180. H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 11. 
181. Id. §§ 11, 13 (violation of § 11 with intent to defraud can be punished by 
fine of up to $500,000 or five years’ imprisonment, or both).  Neither the Data-
base Directive nor the WIPO Proposal explicitly address database management 
information. 
182. Unless stated otherwise, this part addresses only the Database Direc-
tive, not the Proposals.  So the reader will not have to refer back to Part II and 
wrest information, applicable only to the Database Directive, from the Proposals, 
some information previously discussed is repeated in this part. 
183. 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev’d, 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
184. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. 
185. See supra note 11; see also Hugh C. Hansen, International Copyright:  An 
Unorthodox Analysis, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 579, 581 (1996) (explaining that 
one purpose of the Directives is to improve European competitiveness). 
186. But see supra note 5 (explaining that the Directive permits derogation 
for less exacting regimes). 
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fence187 that prohibits unauthorized extraction and reutiliza-
tion188 of the whole or a substantial part189 of electronic and 
nonelectronic databases.190  Available191 to database makers 
 
187. The sui generis regime creates a fence, rather than a wall, because the 
regime permits some leakage (e.g., it permits insubstantial extractions and per-
mits Member States to enact ‘quasi-fair use’ exceptions).  Database Directive, su-
pra note 1, arts. 7-9, O.J. L 77/20, at 25-26 (1996).  Theoretically, the 15-year fence 
can be extended perpetually; however, entitlement to another 15-year fence re-
quires the same showing required for initial protection:  a substantial new in-
vestment.  Id. art. 10(3), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996).  As noted above in Part II, the 
initial term of protection under the Database Directive could approximate 30 
years if the database maker withholds the database for almost 15 years before 
initial release to the public. 
188. Extraction is “the permanent or temporary transfer of all or a substan-
tial part of the contents of a database to another medium by any means or in any 
form.”  Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(a), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996).  
Reutilization is “any form of making available to the public all or a substantial 
part of the contents of a database by the distribution of copies, by renting, by on-
line or other forms of transmission.”  Id. art. 7(2)(b), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996). 
189. “Substantial part” may be evaluated quantitatively or qualitatively.  
Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996).  Though nei-
ther measure is defined by the directive, a lawful user “may not perform acts 
which conflict with normal exploitation of the database or unreasonably preju-
dice the legitimate interests” of the database maker.  Id. art. 8(2), O.J. L 77/20, at 
26 (1996); see also Gaster, supra note 128, at  (explaining that the Commission de-
liberately left the task of defining “substantial part” to the European Court of Jus-
tice); Rosler, supra note 11, at 120 (noting that many industry associations lobbied 
for actual percentage levels to determine infringement). 
190. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 1(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 24 (1996).  The 
Initial Proposal, supra note 11, and the Amended Proposal, supra note 24, covered 
only electronic databases.  The Council extended the scope of the Database Di-
rective to nonelectronic databases because it obviated the need to draw a distinc-
tion between electronic and nonelectronic databases; because the Council 
deemed it inappropriate for a database distributed in both electronic and 
nonelectronic forms to receive different levels of protection; and because no such 
distinction is drawn in other international agreements.  See Common Position, 
supra note 150, Statement of the Council’s Reasons 8, O.J. C 288/02, at 24 (1995).  
Another need for the extension, although not noted in the Database Directive, is 
that today’s high speed scanners and optical character recognition software 
make electronic conversion of nonelectronic databases almost as easy as elec-
tronic conversion of electronic databases.  See Samuelson, supra note 11, at 3-4. 
191. EC Member States must bring into force laws, regulations, and admin-
istrative provisions necessary to comply with the Database Directive before 
January 1, 1998.  Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 16(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 27 
(1996).  In addition, Norway, Iceland, Poland, and Turkey must implement the 
Database Directive in accordance with their bilateral agreements.  See Powell, 
supra note 11, at 1. 
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in Member States192 who can show a substantial invest-
ment193 in obtaining, verifying, or presenting the underlying 
data,194 the toll fence protects the commercial interests of da-
tabase makers while attempting to accommodate the pub-
lic’s interests. 
The Database Directive accommodates the public’s inter-
ests by allowing insubstantial extractions from, and reuse of, 
the contents of databases made publicly available;195 by 
deeming public lending not an act of extraction or reutiliza-
tion;196 by permitting Member States to enact “fair use” ex-
ceptions;197 and by extinguishing the database maker’s right 
to control resale after the first sale.198  Additionally, although 
the Database Directive does not mandate compulsory li-
 
192. See supra note 191. 
193. Substantial investment in data collection can be measured qualitatively 
or quantitatively.  Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 25 
(1996).  Although the Database Directive indicates that compilation of several 
recordings of musical performances on a compact disc is not a substantial 
enough investment to be eligible for sui generis protection, id. recital 19, O.J. L 
77/20, at 21 (1996), it fails to indicate the minimum level of investment required 
for such protection. 
194. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996), re-
cital 40, O.J. L 77/20, at 22 (1996).  Obtaining/verifying data are self-explanatory 
concepts that apply equally to both electronic and nonelectronic databases.  Pre-
senting data is similarly self-explanatory in the context of nonelectronic data-
bases; however, the concept of “presentation” in the context of electronic data-
bases is generally inapplicable because users usually determine how such data is 
presented.  See Ginsburg, supra note 6; Denicola, supra note 12, at 531.  Obtaining, 
verifying, and presenting data will be collectively referred to hereinafter as “data 
collection.” 
195. Unless repeated and systematic insubstantial extractions unreasonably 
prejudice the database maker’s legitimate interests. Database Directive, supra 
note 1, art. 8, O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996); see also id. art. 15, O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996) 
(making contracts to the contrary void). 
196. Id. art. 7(2)(b), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996). 
197. See id. art. 9, O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996) (giving Member States the option 
to provide lawful users of publicly-available databases the right to privately re-
produce nonelectronic databases; the right to use for noncommercial teach-
ing/scientific uses; and the right to use for governmental security, administra-
tive, or judicial purposes). 
198. Id. art. 7(2)(b), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996). 
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censes,199 Member States can theoretically compel them 
when in the public’s interest,200 and, realistically, European 
courts seem ready to vindicate the public’s interest in com-
petition when information producers abuse their dominant 
position.201  Finally, the Database Directive contemplates the 
 
199. Previous proposals mandated compulsory licenses on “fair and nondis-
criminatory terms” in the case of sole-source data.  Sole-source data are data that 
cannot be “independently created, collected or obtained from any other source.”  
See Initial Proposal, supra note 11, art. 8, O.J. C 156/03, at 9 (1992); Amended 
Proposal, supra note 24, art. 11, O.J. C 308/01, at 13-14 (1993). 
200. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 13, O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996) (“This 
directive shall be without prejudice to . . . laws on restrictive practices and unfair 
competition . . . .”). 
201. See, e.g., Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, Case 69/89, [1991] E.C.R. 
485, 4 C.M.L.R. 586 (Ct. First Instance); British Broadcasting Corp. v. Commis-
sion, Case 70/89, [1991] E.C.R. 535, 4 C.M.L.R. 669 (Ct. First Instance); Independ-
ent Television Publications Ltd. v. Commission, Case 76/89, [1991] E.C.R. 575, 4 
C.M.L.R. 775 (Ct. First Instance).  In Magill, Magill TV Guide Ltd. (“Magill”) at-
tempted to publish a comprehensive television program guide based upon 
weekly listings published in separate program guides by British and Irish broad-
casters (no comprehensive listing was available to viewers in Ireland).  Joined 
Cases, 241/91 & 242/91, [1995] E.C.R. 743, 812, ¶ 10.  Availing themselves of the 
copyright protection afforded listings in Ireland and Great Britain, the broad-
casters sought and obtained an injunction against Magill, who had already 
lodged a complaint with the European Commission.  Id. at 812, ¶¶ 10-11.  The 
Commission found that the broadcasters had abused a dominant position and 
ordered the broadcasters to supply their weekly listings to parties requesting 
them for a reasonable rate, effectively forcing a compulsory license.  Id. at 812-13, 
¶¶ 12-13.  The European Court of Justice upheld the compulsory licensing order, 
finding that there was consumer demand for the comprehensive guide for which 
there was no available substitute, and held that the broadcasters’ refusal to sup-
ply the data prevented the appearance of a new product and the broadcasters’ 
had therefore abused a dominant position in violation of Article 86 of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Economic Community,  Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 
11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].  Radio Telefis 
Eireann, [1995] E.C.R. at 824, ¶¶ 53-54.  Although Article 86 is triggered only 
when abuse of a dominant position has the potential to affect trade between 
Member States, David Harbord, Barriers to Entry and Exit in European Competition 
Policy, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 411, 421 (1994), it is not necessary that the con-
duct in question have an actual, substantial effect on trade; rather, it is only nec-
essary the conduct is capable of having such an effect. Radio Telefis Eireann, [1995] 
E.C.R. at 828, ¶ 69.  Moreover, competition policy in the EC is converging.  See 
generally LEAH DAVISON ET AL., THE EUROPEAN COMPETITIVE MARKET (1995) (ex-
plaining that national competition policy is beginning to reflect supranational 
competition policy).  Furthermore, as markets within the Community become 
more European in character, it will be increasingly difficult to prove that a par-
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public’s interest in free competition by mandating a triennial 
review of the sui generis regime to determine whether anti-
competitive effects require the establishment of a compul-
sory licensing scheme.202 
Yet, despite these seemingly broad protections of the 
public interest, many commentators, echoing the monocular 
vision of Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service,203 have 
expressed serious concerns about the negative effects of the 
Database Directive on the “free” flow of information,204 
while others have argued that the Database Directive is anti-
competitive and will retard long-term growth in the data-
base industry.205  To determine whether these concerns are 
                                                                                                                                  
ticular activity will have only a purely national effect.  Id.  Thus, plaintiffs should 
find it increasingly easier to use Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty to enjoin 
anticompetitive behavior within the European Economic Community (“EEC”); 
see generally Corbet, supra, note 29 (analyzing the interaction between EC compe-
tition law and intellectual property law). 
202. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 16(3), O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996) 
(“[E]very three years . . . the Commission . . . shall examine in particular the ap-
plication of the sui generis right, . . . especially whether the application of this 
right has led to abuse of a dominant position or other interference with free 
competition which would justify . . . the establishment of non-voluntary licens-
ing arrangements.”). 
203. See supra note 12.  Feist’s myopic focus on the inability of facts to be 
original (an epistemologically erroneous view, see supra note 37), and almost 
singular concern over harming the public by creating a monopoly in public do-
main materials, “grossly neglect[ed] copyright’s incentive role.”  See Ginsburg, 
supra note 6, at 350. 
204. See Rosler, supra note 11, at 146 (the Database Directive’s most danger-
ous aspect is “its potential to stifle access to information”); Reichman & 
Samuelson, supra note 4, at 108-17, 123-24 (arguing that, by impeding the flow of 
information, the Database Directive and Proposals will put basic science and 
other public interest groups at risk); Academy Letter, supra note 23, at 1-2 (argu-
ing that the pending WIPO Proposal “would seriously undermine the ability of 
researchers and educators to access and use scientific data, and would have a 
deleterious long-term impact on our nation’s research capabilities”); GLOBAL 
ACCESS, supra note 4, at 35 (summarizing the potential effects of an “overly pro-
tective database regime”). 
205. See Rosler, supra note 11, at 108 (arguing that the Database Directive 
will fail both as an international trade mechanism and as an economic policy); see 
also Von Simson, supra note 23, at 766-68 (arguing that because the sui generis re-
gime will reward lower-level economic behavior (data collection), compilers will 
have little incentive to invest higher-level creative activity that result in user-
friendly features).  However, this view ignores the pressure to provide user-
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well-founded, it is useful to apply the Database Directive’s 
protections, and other offsetting ameliorative measures 
available to members of the EC, to a set of facts. 
A. Vindicating the Competitive Ethos in Nonproprietary 
Data:  Forcing Free Riders to Become Fair Followers 
Aimed at increasing European market share in the data-
base market,206 the transferable sui generis rights207 created 
by the Database Directive raise a legal barrier to misappro-
priation208 of database makers’ investment in data collec-
tion.209  Assuming a database maker can prove a substantial 
enough investment210 to secure protection, the sui generis re-
gime affords the maker two complementary quasi-property 
                                                                                                                                  
friendly features inherent in the competitive market.  See Digital Equip., 73 F.3d at 
762 (“[P]igheaded refusal to satisfy customers’ preferences . . . leads to ruin as 
rivals step in to take the business.”)  In addition, it ignores the fact that higher-
level creative activity will still enjoy copyright protection under the Database Di-
rective.  See generally Database Directive, supra note 1, arts. 3-6, O.J. L 77/20, at 25 
(1996). 
206. See supra note 11.  The lagging European market can be explained in 
part by fragmented nature of the European market and the economies of scale 
achieved in the larger United States market.  See Melnik, supra note 2, at 60; see 
also Rosler, supra note 11, at 109-10 (noting that the United States retains many 
advantages in the database market, including a monolingual market, and 
economies of scale built upon years of industry experience and consolidation). 
207. The sui generis rights may be transferred, assigned or granted under 
contractual license.  Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(3), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 
(1996). 
208. Database Directive, supra note 1, recital 39, O.J. L 77/20, at 22 (1996) 
(providing that “this Directive seeks to safeguard the positions of makers of da-
tabases against misappropriation” of financial and human capital investment in 
obtaining, verifying or presenting data); cf. International News Serv. v. Associ-
ated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (recognizing misappropriation); see generally 
Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information:  Intellectual Property and the Restitu-
tionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992). 
209. “Data collection” is defined supra note 194. 
210. See Database Directive, supra note 1, recitals 53-54, O.J. L 77/20, at 24 
(1996) (burden on maker to prove substantial enough investment to secure pro-
tection).  Unfortunately, like many key terms of the Database Directive, the sub-
stantial investment criterion is ill-defined.  See supra note 193.  Thus, the burden a 
database maker must carry to secure protection under the sui generis regime will 
remain uncertain until interpreted by the European courts. 
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rights:211  the right to prevent extraction of the contents of 
the database and the right to prevent reutilization of the con-
tents of the database.212  Of capital importance in assessing 
these rights is understanding, first, their linkage to the con-
tents of the database, and second, that neither extends copy-
right protection to the underlying facts and data.213 
 Rather than attempting to assess these rights in a theo-
retical vacuum, the following assessment is made in light of 
the factual background of ProCD v. Zeidenberg,214 a case that 
underscores the need for a sui generis regime to protect com-
pilers from the malcompetitive behavior of free riders and 
information Samaritans, and provides a set of facts tailor-
made for exploring the application and outer limits of the 
Database Directive’s sui generis regime. 
1. The Facts of ProCD v. Zeidenberg 
In creating a comprehensive, nationwide electronic 
phone directory, the database maker in Zeidenberg spent ap-
 
211. See Gordon, supra note 115, at 1546.  The sui generis regime does not cre-
ate de jure property rights in the underlying facts, although in the case of sole-
source data, which cannot be independently generated or acquired from another 
source, it may create de facto property rights in the underlying facts.  For this rea-
son and because of the potential exceptions and limits on the sui generis rights, 
these rights lie somewhere between the exclusive property right in expression 
granted by copyright and the protection afforded noncopyrightable facts by INS.  
See INS, 248 U.S. at 236.  With regard to nonproprietary data, the sui generis re-
gime functions more like permanent, portable trade secret protection; that is, the 
second comer is presented with a two options:  obtain a license from the data-
base maker to access its contents or obtain its contents by “proper means.”  Cf. 
Reichman, supra note 10, at 2438-40. 
212. “Extraction” is defined supra at note 188; “reutilization” is defined supra 
at notes 121 and 188; see Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(1), O.J. L 77/20, 
at 25 (1996). 
213. Id. recital 45, O.J. L 77/20, at 23 (1996).  As a result, that which is in the 
public domain, remains in the public domain.  However, this postulation breaks 
down in the case of sole-source data.  Moreover, the incentive it creates to privat-
ize data raises concerns about the flow of information that must be addressed by 
ameliorative measures.  These concerns are discussed infra at text accompanying 
notes 262-322. 
214. See supra note 183. 
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proximately $10 million215 compiling more than ninety-five 
million residential and commercial listings from approxi-
mately 3,000 telephone directories.216  After purchasing the 
listings on compact disc for less than $200, the free rider elec-
tronically extracted and recompiled twenty million listings 
from the maker’s database into his own database, and made 
“his” listings freely217 available over the Internet.218  On cross 
motions for summary judgment, the district court, while not-
ing the database maker’s argument that the free rider’s con-
duct was unfair and commercially destructive had “substan-
tial equitable appeal,” rejected the maker’s federal copyright 
claim, as well as the maker’s state law claims of breach of 
contract, misappropriation, and unfair competition.219  Thus, 
the district court’s holding left the free rider, and others like 
him, free to purchase the databases of others, to ignore the 
shrink-wrap license, to extract electronically the database’s 
contents at a fraction of the makers’ effort, and then to sell 
that content in a different wrapper for a lower price,220 or to 
 
215. Judge Freezes Student’s Internet Service, B. GLOBE, Sept. 24, 1995, at 41. 
216. See Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. at 644. 
217. Although the free rider charged for advertising in this case, the Data-
base Directive would prevent all free riders, whether commercially motivated or 
not, from engaging in such commercially destructive (incentive-reducing) behav-
ior.  See Database Directive, supra note 1, arts. 8-9, O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996). 
218. See Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. at 646. 
219. See id. at 643. The district court refused to treat the shrink-wrap license 
as a licensing agreement.  Id. at 650-51.  Instead, the court held the agreement 
unenforceable under the Uniform Commercial Code for lack of assent (the free 
rider was a graduate student who disregarded screen warnings that use of the 
product was subject to the license agreement).  Id. at 655.  Although the district 
court’s holding with regard to the federal copyright claim was a logical applica-
tion of Feist, the court’s rejection of the shrink-wrap license was analytically un-
sound.  G. M. Hunsucker, Raising a Toll Fence to Protect the “Noncreative” La-
bors of Database Makers:  The European Database Directive 15 n.43 (May 1, 
1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Professor J. H. Reichman, Vanderbilt 
University School of Law).  Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit reversed on appeal.  
See supra note 25; see also National Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 1997 WL 
34001, at *34010 (2d Cir. 1997) (approving the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of the 
state contract law claim). 
220. See supra notes 5, 73 and accompanying text; see also Reichman, supra 
note 10, at 2452-53. 
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provide that content to others free of charge.221 
2. Protecting the Database Maker’s Investment from 
Free Riders and Information Samaritans 
In the illustrative case, the free rider electronically ex-
tracted twenty million of the ninety-five million telephone 
listings contained in the maker’s database,222 downloaded 
them to his hard drive, and then recompiled the listings into 
his own database.223  Under the sui generis regime created by 
the Database Directive, the free rider’s first act violated the 
database maker’s right to prevent extraction because he ex-
tracted224 the contents of the database and because that ex-
traction was substantial.225  Similarly, when the free rider 
later made “his” database accessible via his Internet web 
page, he violated the database maker’s right to prevent re-
utilization because he made a substantial part of the contents 
of the maker’s database publicly available.226 
 
221. See supra note 5. 
222. Court Decision Goes Against Pro CD, ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE REP., Jan. 
23, 1996, available in Westlaw, Allnewsplus File.  To put this into perspective, if 
one amortizes the data collection costs to the database maker over the all 95 mil-
lion listings, the free rider saved over two million dollars in data collection costs; 
or, to put it another way, the free rider appropriated over two million dollars of 
the maker’s investment in data collection. 
223. See Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. at 645-46. 
224. The free rider’s first act would have been an extraction whether he 
downloaded the data to his hard drive, printer, or any other medium.  See supra 
note 188 (defining “extraction”).  Moreover, even if the free rider had accom-
plished the transfer by manually keying the data in, and had thus expended  
considerably more effort, it would still constitute an unauthorized extraction un-
der the Database Directive.  See supra note 188. 
225. Like many of the operative terms in the Database Directive, what pre-
cisely constitutes a “substantial part” of the contents of the database is not de-
fined.  Apparently, the Commission intended to leave the definitional task to the 
European courts. See Gaster, supra note 128, at .  However, it would defy com-
mon sense, as well as the policy to protect database makers from the misappro-
priation of their data collection efforts, to find that the free rider, who extracted 
20 million of 95 million telephone listings contained in a maker’s database did 
not extract a substantial part of the contents of the database. 
226. Id. 
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Even if a court found that the free rider did not extract or 
reuse a substantial part of the database contents, the data-
base maker could fall back on a second prong of protec-
tion—the right to prevent extraction or reutilization of in-
substantial parts of the database—when those repeated 
insubstantial extractions or reutilizations unreasonably 
prejudice the maker’s rights.227  Here, the free rider’s data-
base permitted extraction of 1,000 listings per search, and 
prior to the law suit was being accessed via the Internet ap-
proximately 20,000 times per day.228 
With the explosive growth of Internet access providers,229 
information-rich Web pages,230 and user-friendly interfaces 
that make “surfing the Net” easy even for neophytes,231 it 
seems reasonable to conclude that many users would forego 
the $200 price tag of the database maker’s product in favor 
of free access to the free rider’s product.  Thus, by making 
the contents of the database maker’s product freely available 
to the public, the free rider’s actions unreasonably preju-
diced the maker’s rights and interfered with the maker’s 
normal exploitation of the database.  As a result, the theo-
retical EC database maker would be entitled to appropriate 
remedies.232 
 
227. Although database makers cannot prevent lawful users from extract-
ing/reutilizing insubstantial parts of the publicly-available databases, Database 
Directive, supra note 1, art. 8(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996), lawful users must re-
frain from performing acts that unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the database maker.  Id. art. 8(2), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996); see also id. art. 15, O.J. 
L 77/20, at 27 (1996) (making contractual provisions contrary to article 8 null and 
void). 
228. See Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. at 646. 
229. Cf. id. (noting that lawsuits concerning ownership of data distributed 
via the Internet is natural given the explosive growth of the Internet) (citing Jane 
C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the “Information SuperHighway”:  Authors, Exploiters, 
and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466 (1995)). 
230. See Cade Metz, The 100 Top Web Sites, PC MAG., Feb. 6, 1996, at 100. 
231. See Rick Ayre & Thomas Mace, Just Browsing, PC MAG., Mar. 12, 1996, 
at 100. 
232. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 12, O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996) 
(requiring Member States to provide appropriate remedies for infringements of 
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Thus, the Database Directive not only protects database 
makers from free riders who seek to gain a competitive ad-
vantage by extracting the contents of the maker’s database 
(and thereby avoid the costs of data collection),233 but also 
protects database makers from the market-destructive antics 
of information Samaritans.234  In this respect, the Directive 
fills two gaps left by existing legal regimes.235 
Moreover, long-term production incentives for database 
production are more sustainable under the Directive’s sui 
generis regime because the existence and degree of protection 
are linked to investment,236 rather than the superficial form 
of the final product hailed the linchpin of protection by 
copyright law.237  Furthermore, by jettisoning the paradoxi-
cal linchpins of arrangement and selection238 required for da-
tabase protection under most copyright regimes,239 the Di-
                                                                                                                                  
the rights provided by the Database Directive). 
233. See supra note 99; see also National Basketball Ass’n, 1997 WL 34001, at 
*34013-15 (rejecting the NBA’s claim that Motorola was free-riding by transmit-
ting NBA game statistics almost contemporaneously, because Motorola was not 
free riding, but rather independently collecting, assembling, and transmitting the 
data).  In NBA v. Motorola, however, the Second Circuit hinted that its analysis 
might differ if Motorola were collecting the facts (free riding) via a NBA data-
feed.  Id. at *34013-14. 
234. See supra note 5. 
235. See supra notes 57-101 and accompanying text. 
236. See Denicola, supra note 12, at 530 (sufficient production incentives can-
not be maintained without linking the existence and degree of protection to the 
total production costs).  Although one can doubtless provide examples of data-
bases that would be produced with far less than 15 years of protection provided 
by the Database Directive, even copyright and the law of trade secrets produce 
questionable results on their margins.  Can one justify protecting a copyrighted 
work for an additional 74 years after it has netted the creator several million dol-
lars in its first year?  Eternal trade secret protection for a consumable item 
proven to cause physiological damage, which has no redeeming characteristics? 
237. Id. 
238. The linchpins are paradoxical because although both requirements 
purport to protect the public’s interest in public domain information, they also 
work against the public’s interest in promoting knowledge in several ways.  See 
supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text; see generally Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 
344-46; Reichman, supra note 10, at 2491. 
239. See Berne Convention, supra note 8, art. 2(5), 828 U.N.T.S. at 221; 17 
U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 103; Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 
 
 
 
 
 
746 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [7:697 
 
rective’s sui generis regime avoids the perverse incentives 
that reduce the accessibility and usability of databases240 and 
ultimately work against the public’s interest in promoting 
knowledge.241 
Finally, this act of legal candor242 in recognizing that the 
compiler’s primary contribution to the promotion of knowl-
edge is through investment in data collection,243 rather than 
data arrangement or selection, leaves courts free to focus on 
protecting the commercial interests of the database maker 
from parasitic competitors and other misappropriators who 
reduce incentives to produce commercially-valuable data-
bases. 
3. Protecting the Public’s Interest in Competition 
Protecting the database maker’s commercial interests, 
however, does not mean that the misappropriation fence 
raised by the Database Directive completely insulates the da-
tabase maker from all competition.244  On the contrary, be-
cause the fence prohibits only extraction and/or reutilization 
of the contents of databases, and does not extend copyright 
protection to mere facts or data,245 the fence merely pro-
scribes one method of data collection;246 it does not empower 
database makers to remove data from the public domain.247 
                                                                                                                                  
U.S. 340, 356 (1991); Database Directive, supra note 1, recitals 15-16, O.J. L 77/20, 
at 21, art. 3(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996). 
240. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text  
241. See supra notes 38, 65-71 and accompanying text  
242. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 154 (“[T]he European Commis-
sion’s frank acknowledgment that the [Database Directive’s sui generis regime] 
would protect investment as such amounts to a refreshing act of legal candor.”). 
243. See Denicola, supra note 12, at 530. 
244. But see Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 90 (arguing that, under 
the Database Directive, the database maker obtains protection exceeded only by 
the protection afforded patent holders). 
245. See Database Directive, supra note 1, recital 45, O.J. L 77/20, at 23 (1996). 
246. See Denicola, supra note 12, at 541. 
247. See supra note 213. 
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It follows necessarily that fair followers248 remain free to 
create identical databases, so long as they do not create those 
databases by appropriating the contents from a protected 
database.249  Thus, under the Database Directive, the free-
rider-turned-fair-follower can go forth, collect the same data, 
and compile and market an identical database or any variant 
thereof,250 without infringing the rights provided by the sui 
generis regime to the database maker.251 
Alternatively, the fair follower can seek a license from the 
database maker.252  Although the Database Directive does 
not mandate licensing,253 the database maker risks price 
competition from more efficient fair followers if the maker 
 
248. See Reichman, supra note 30. 
249. This statement assumes the contents of, or the database itself, do not 
enjoy copyright protection.  Professor Litman’s observation that this result is 
functionally indistinguishable from granting copyright protection to the underly-
ing facts, Litman, supra note 37, at 1016 & n.289, holds true in the case of proprie-
tary data, but not in the case of nonproprietary data.  To illustrate, assume a 
copyright holder in a literary work, by definition expression not existing in the 
public domain, proves that a second comer who produced an identical work had 
access to the first work.  Notwithstanding incantations that independent creation 
is a perfect defense in copyright, see, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 
81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936), it seems incredulous to 
suggest that the second comer could overcome the presumption of copying and 
the inherent skepticism of judges and juries.  Now assume a similar situation for 
a database of nonproprietary facts protected under the sui generis regime.  Here, 
the second comer can more easily produce objective evidence demonstrating the 
data collection costs incurred in gathering public domain materials.  As a practi-
cal matter, the second comer would have a lower burden of production under 
the sui generis regime. 
250. This statement assumes the data are freely accessible and not otherwise 
protected.  Using the Zeidenberg facts as an example, if the data were protected, 
the database maker would be in the same position vis-à-vis the compilers of the 
3,000 directories as the free rider was to the maker.  The irony of the database 
maker’s suing the free rider, after cloaking himself with the constitutional pro-
tection afforded free riders by Feist (the database maker copied unprotected data 
from 3,000 directories) was perhaps a, if not the, critical factor in the district 
court’s decision to deny relief.  See Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. at 658 (it is ironic that 
after obtaining the benefits of copyright, the plaintiff seeks to prevent others 
from obtaining those same benefits). 
251. See supra notes 13, 56. 
252. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text. 
253. See infra note 273. 
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tries to extract too high a price for the license.254 
Similarly, because data are fungible, the database maker 
who overprices his product also risks price competition from 
more efficient fair followers who independently create iden-
tical databases.255  Consequently, competitive pressures in 
the nonproprietary database market should provide the da-
tabase maker with an incentive to achieve greater efficiency 
in data collection:  the more efficient the maker is in collect-
ing the data, the harder it will be for fair followers to com-
pete on a price basis.256 
Thus, unlike other intellectual property regimes, such as 
copyright and patent, which use a winner-take-all approach 
to overcome risk aversion,257 the sui generis regime, at least 
with respect to nonproprietary data, serves the same “pro-
competitive functions as does the law of trade secrets”258 
without requiring actual secrecy.259  Therefore, with respect 
to nonproprietary data,260 the combination of market-
imposed price limits and market inducements to achieve 
maximum efficiency in data collection should redound to the 
benefit of the information-using public in the form of more 
 
254. Cf. National Basketball Ass’n, 1997 WL 34001, at *34014 (explaining that 
the data collector producing the cheaper or otherwise superior product will pre-
vail in the marketplace). 
255. Id. 
256. Other factors affect the fair follower’s ability to compete on a price ba-
sis.  For example, data which is extremely difficult to collect may give the first 
database maker sufficient time to gain significant market share, which in turn 
may act as a barrier to entry.  See supra note 100.  In addition, data accuracy is 
also a consideration that may affect an unknown fair follower’s ability to com-
pete because data users may be unwilling to gamble on unknown data compilers 
when accuracy is critical.  See Roger Elliot, Chairman’s Report (visited May 11, 
1997) <http://www.grainger.uiuc.edu/icsu/confchmn.htm> (noting need for 
strict peer review of scientific data submitted for publication in electronic jour-
nals); cf. Perritt, supra note 4, at . 
257. See Reichman, supra note 4, at 486. 
258. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d at 1455 (citing Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV Indus., 
925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991)); cf. Reichman, supra note 10, at 2439-40. 
259. See supra note 57. 
260. See supra note 24. 
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comprehensive and less costly databases.261 
B. Criticisms of the Database Directive Regarding Sole-
Source Data:  Is the Sky Falling? 
June 13, 2013:  
Yesterday scientists discovered a method which 
stimulates the body’s immune system to a level suffi-
cient to kill the AIDS virus . . . . Unfortunately the sci-
entists have embodied these data within a database, 
have set the price of each treatment at one million 
dollars, and have refused to license the critical data. 
—Chicken Little, The Sky Is Falling, CASSANDRA WEEKLY, 
at 13. 
Although perhaps a bit extreme, the hyperbole makes the 
point:  extending the sui generis extraction and reutilization 
rights to database makers who are also data sources, or who 
are the exclusive licensee of data sources, creates the risk of 
data privatization,262 with its attendant risk of monopolistic 
pricing, for potentially perpetual fifteen-year renewable pe-
riods,263 rather than just legitimately protecting the invest-
ments of database makers.264  For that reason and several 
others, it initially appears that this Article’s working hy-
pothesis, that the sui generis regime vindicates the competi-
tive ethos, breaks down in the case of sole-source data.265 
First, the implicit market limits that flow from the possi-
 
261. But see supra notes 204-05, infra note 362 (citing commentators who ar-
gue that regime will result in data monopolies, which will, in turn, stifle access to 
information). 
262. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 84-85 (arguing that the Da-
tabase Directive would eventually abolish public domain data). 
263. See supra note 187 (noting that a “renewal” requires a substantial new 
investment). 
264. Even the Directive’s harshest critics agree that database makers have 
legitimate interests in a new form of legal protection.  See Reichman & Sam-
uelson, supra note 4, at 55; GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 24-25. 
265. See supra notes 24, 198 (defining “sole-source data”). 
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bility of fair followers being more efficient data collectors are 
reduced, and in limited circumstances eliminated, in the case 
of sole-source data because the fence created by the sui 
generis regime effectively enables the first database maker to 
control dissemination of the raw data.266  This power to con-
trol the dissemination of sole-source data enables the first 
database maker not only to charge monopolistic fees for ac-
cess to the database, but also to charge monopolistic licens-
ing fees, if the database maker chooses to license at all, to fair 
followers seeking to use the sole-source data in a competing 
or value-added product.267 
Second, the sui generis regime creates an incentive to pri-
vatize data that in turn raises legitimate concerns over data-
base makers’ ability to control the dissemination of informa-
tion.268  Because anyone can make a database, including 
those in charge of conducting basic scientific research, this 
incentive could spill over into academia and reduce the indi-
rect subsidies now provided to private research and devel-
opment.269  Although privatizing data might result in more 
short-term basic research, privatization of data as such could 
stifle innovation by diminishing long-term research and de-
velopment, particularly if database makers secure exclusive 
licenses and effect a cartelization of data sources.270 
The initial and amended versions of the Database Direc-
tive addressed these potential problems head-on by mandat-
ing compulsory licenses on fair and nondiscriminatory terms 
 
266. See supra note 213  
267. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 117-19 (sui generis regime 
will impede competition in the value-added market). 
268. See Rosler, supra note 11, at 141-42.  Although the sui generis regimes 
raise potential First Amendment issues, see, e.g., Reichman & Samuelson, supra 
note 4, at 79, those issues are beyond the scope of this Article. 
269. See Reichman, supra note 10, at 2498; see also infra note 356
 
270. Cf. Reichman, supra note 10, at 2497-98.  But see infra notes 373-85 and 
accompanying notes (discussing  
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in the case of sole-source data.271  However, the Common 
Position272 removed the compulsory licensing provision in 
favor of other ameliorative measures aimed at protecting the 
user.273  The next section examines these ameliorative meas-
ures in light of the criticisms regarding sole-source data 
noted above,274 to ascertain whether the Database Directive’s 
sui generis regime is underprotective, overprotective, or per-
haps somewhere between the two extremes.275 
C. The Ameliorative Measures:  Will They Protect the 
Public’s Interest in Competition? 
The Database Directive not only provides swords that 
 
271. Initial Proposal, supra note 11, art. 8, O.J. C 156/03, at 9 (1992); 
Amended Proposal, supra note 24, art. 11, O.J. C 308/01, at 13-14 (1993). 
272. See supra note 150. 
273. According to the Council, the compulsory licensing provision was no 
longer needed in light of the narrower scope of the sui generis rights and the ex-
ceptions provided in article 9.  Common Position, supra note 150, Statement of 
the Council’s Reasons 15, O.J. C 288/02, at 26-27 (1995).  Both justifications seem 
to contradict the terms of the Database Directive.  First, although the sui generis 
rights, as positively stated in the Amended Proposal, extended to “part or all” of 
the database, see Amended Proposal, supra note 24, art. 10(1), O.J. C 308/01, at 13 
(1993), the Database Directive still prohibits repeated and systematic extraction 
of insubstantial parts if that extraction conflicts with the normal exploitation of 
that database or unreasonably prejudices the maker’s rights.  See Database Direc-
tive, supra note 1, art. 7(3), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996); see also id. art. 8(2), O.J. L 
77/20, at 26 (1996) (prohibiting users from performing any act; e.g., tampering 
with the database, that conflicts with the normal exploitation of that database or 
unreasonably prejudices the maker’s rights).  Second, the “fair use” exceptions in 
article 9 are optional within the Member States.  See id. art. 9, O.J. L 77/20, at 26 
(1996).  Nonetheless, the Council’s citation to them as a reason for removing the 
compulsory license indicates its intent that the exceptions be passed.  See Com-
mon Position, supra note 150, Statement of the Council’s Reasons 15, O.J. C 
288/02, at 26-27 (1995).  Accordingly, even if a particular member state did not 
enact the exceptions, they would probably be significant factors in any appeal to 
the Commission regarding abuse of the sui generis rights.  See infra notes 277-92 
and accompanying text (discussing  
274. See supra notes 262-70 and accompanying text. 
275. For example, a solution that approximates pareto optimality. “Pareto 
optimality” refers to the point at which no change can be implemented that will 
make someone better off without making someone else worse off.  See VISCUSI, 
supra note 38, at 74-75. 
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enable fair followers to protect the public’s interest in com-
petition, but also provides shields to users who are not seek-
ing to compete, but are performing functions deemed suffi-
ciently important to provide exceptions to the sui generis 
rights afforded database makers.276  While examining the 
swords provided by the Database Directive, to fully under-
stand the potential swath fair followers can cut with these 
swords, one must simultaneously examine the arenas in 
which they can be drawn and the decision-makers who will 
determine whether these swords are required to protect the 
public’s interest in competition in a given case. 
1. The Swords:  The European Economic 
Community Treaty and Competition Law 
Once fully implemented, the Database Directive’s sui 
generis regime will, like other laws passed pursuant to the 
European Economic Community (“EEC”) Treaty,277 take 
precedence over national laws.278  However, the sui generis 
rights are expressly limited by both national and Commu-
nity rules of competition.279  As a result, a fair follower ag-
grieved by the anticompetitive behavior of a database maker 
can file a complaint not only with the Commission of the 
European Communities (“Commission”)280 if the anticom-
petitive behavior violates one of the EEC competition 
 
276. See infra notes 294-318 and accompanying text. 
277. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,  Mar. 25, 
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II). 
278. See Corbet, supra note 29, at 330. 
279. See Database Directive, supra note 1, recital 47, O.J. L 77/20, at 23 (1996).  
The EC rules of competition are reported in Corbet, supra note 29, at note 84. 
280. The Commission investigates and adjudicates complaints under Arti-
cles 85 and 86 that address the distortion of competition and the abuse of a 
dominant position.  Corbet, supra note 29, at 332.  The Commission’s decision is 
appealable to the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, and 
questions of law are thereafter appealable to the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities.  Id.; see also Radio Telefis Eireann, [1995] E.C.R. at 828, ¶¶ 67-68 (ap-
peal to Court of Justice only on questions of law, not facts). 
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rules,281 but can also file a complaint in a national forum 
based on violation of the EEC Treaty282 or any national com-
petition rule.283 
Perhaps the most powerful sword a fair follower can 
wield is the one provided by Article 86 of the EEC Treaty 
(“Article 86”).  Article 86 prohibits the abuse of a dominant 
position within the common market, or in a substantial part 
of the common market, that affects trade between Member 
States.284  Value-added competitors have effectively wielded 
the sword afforded by Article 86 to force compulsory li-
censes even when copyright law buttressed the dominant 
position.285 
For example, in Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission 
(“Magill”),286 the European Court of Justice upheld a com-
pulsory licensing order forcing television broadcasters to 
supply their weekly program listings to a competitor who 
sought to produce a value-added product (a television pro-
gram guide) not otherwise available on the market.287  If the 
European Court of Justice is willing to vindicate the public’s 
interest in competition for television program guides so the 
 
281. See Corbet, supra note 29, at 347.  The EEC competition rules include 
articles 85-94 of the EEC Treaty, and other treaties.  Id. at 348 n.84.  Articles 85 
and 86 of the EEC Treaty are by far the most important, id., and are the only ones 
of concern in this Article. 
282. Although national forums may apply EEC law, they must refer ques-
tions of EEC law to the European Court of Justice for an interlocutory and bind-
ing (in the case and as precedent) ruling. See Corbet, supra note 29, at 330-32. 
283. In this regard, the Commission has noted the tendency of Member 
States to redraft their national rules consistent with EEC law. See DAVISON ET AL., 
supra note 201, at 46-47. 
284. See EEC Treaty, supra note 201, art. 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. 
T.S. No. 1. 
285. See Radio Telefis Eireann, [1995] E.C.R. at 823, ¶ 50 (noting that failure to 
supply information prevented new product from appearing on the market).  As 
the Magill court explained, “it is . . . clear . . . that the exercise of an exclusive 
right by the proprietor may, in exceptional circumstances, involve abusive con-
duct.”  Id. (citing Volvo AB v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 
6211, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 122)). 
286. Joined Cases, 241/91 & 242/91, [1995] E.C.R. 743; see supra note 136. 
287. See Radio Telefis Eireann, [1995] E.C.R. at 837, ¶ 104, [1995]. 
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public may “arrange [their] leisure activi-
ties . . . accordingly,”288 how much more willing will the 
Court be to vindicate that interest in areas vital to scientific 
and technical progress? 
In addition, to attack database makers who secure exclu-
sive licenses, or otherwise engage in collusive activity to 
thwart competition, fair followers can wield the sword pro-
vided by Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (“Article 85”).289  
Taken together, Articles 85 and 86, and the “Excalibur-like” 
pro-competitive sword found in Magill,290 along with the in-
creasing willingness of European firms to abandon anticom-
petitive practices when challenged by the Commission,291 
may be sufficient in and of themselves to protect the public’s 
interest in competition by forcing would-be data monopoliz-
ers to supply their data on reasonable terms.292  Yet the Da-
tabase Directive goes further by mandating a triennial re-
view of the sui generis rights to determine whether the 
public’s interest in free competition requires additional pro-
tective measures, including additional swords such as com-
pulsory licenses, or additional shields such as the ones de-
scribed below.293 
 
288. Id. at 795, ¶ 173. 
289. Article 85 prohibits “all agreements between undertakings . . . and con-
certed practices” which may prevent, restrict, or distort competition within the 
common market.  See EEC Treaty, supra note 201, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1. 
290. The swords available to fair followers in the EC are preserved by 
TRIPS.  See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
33 I.L.M. 1197, in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:  Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade 
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, Annex 1C, art. 40 (2) [hereinafter 
TRIPs]; see also Fox, supra note 29, at 485 (“TRIPS reserves to nations the right to 
control anticompetitive practices.”). 
291. See DAVISON ET AL., supra note 201, at 46. 
292. The Commission, whose proposals contained a compulsory licensing 
requirement, see the Initial and Amended proposals, supra notes 11, 24 will be 
available to the fair follower as an initial adjudicative body capable of compel-
ling the license.  See Corbet, supra note 29, at 322-23. 
293. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 16(3), O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996).  
The drafters of the Database Directive intended that the same pro-competitive 
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2. Mandatory and Optional Shields to Protect the 
User 
Unlike the swords afforded fair followers in the interests 
of competition, the protections discussed in this section pur-
port to act as shields to protect the legitimate rights of users 
and others.294  The Database Directive mandates two shields 
and permits Member States to enact three “fair use” shields.  
Although the Council295 based its decision to eliminate the 
compulsory licensing provision in part on the “fair use” 
shields,296 their adoption remains optional to Member 
States.297 
a. The Mandatory Shields 
The first mandatory shield deems public lending not an 
act of extraction or utilization.  Logically, this shield would 
                                                                                                                                  
principles be available to fair followers seeking to compete with sui generis 
rightholders.  See Database Directive, supra note 1, recital 47, O.J. L 77/20, at 23 
(1996).  As explained in the Database Directive:  
[I]n the interests of competition between suppliers of information prod-
ucts and services, protection by the sui generis right must not be af-
forded in such a way as to facilitate abuses of a dominant position, in 
particular as regards the creation and ditribution [sic] of new products 
and services which have an intellectual, documentary, technical, eco-
nomic or commercial added value . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
294. Database Directive, supra note 1, recitals 49-51, O.J. L 77/20, at 23 
(1996). 
295. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
296. See Common Position, supra note 150, Statement of the Council’s Rea-
sons 15, O.J. C 288/02, at 26-27 (1995) and Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 9, 
O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996). 
297. See Common Position, supra note 150, Statement of the Council’s Rea-
sons 15, O.J. C 288/02, at 26-27 (1995) and Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 9, 
O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996).  The Parliament’s failure to require adoption of these 
optional shields conflicts with the professed harmonization goals of the EC in 
promulgating the Database Directive.  See Common Position, supra note 150, 
Statement of the Council’s Reasons 4, O.J. C 288/02, at 23 (1995).  Failure to 
mandate adoption of these shields by Member States could work especial hard-
ships on academicians and scientists whose research knows no artificial territo-
rial boundaries.  See SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS, supra note 23, at 7-4 (ex-
plaining that scientific and academic research is an international undertaking 
that knows now artificial geographic or political boundaries). 
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belong to libraries, but it appeared in the Common Position 
without comment or explanation.298 
The second mandatory shield permits users to make in-
substantial extractions and reutilizations for “any purposes 
whatsoever.”299  “Any purposes whatsoever” is limited by 
the correlative obligations imposed on users to refrain from 
committing acts that “conflict with a normal exploitation of 
the database or unreasonably prejudice the legitimate inter-
ests of the maker of the database.”300  Given the unabashed 
commercial focus of the Database Directive on the database 
maker’s investment interests,301 users hiding behind this 
shield should tread carefully when their use might prejudice 
those commercial interests. 
On the other hand, the commercial focus of the Database 
Directive302 might aid those using database contents for non-
commercial purposes.  For example, a scientist recompiling 
insubstantial portions of old data for noncommercial pur-
poses, from a database whose commercial value derives 
primarily from the timeliness of its data,303 could argue that 
 
298. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(2), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996).  
However, logically library users would still be subject to limits of the Database 
Directive; else, this provision would allow competitors to circumvent the protec-
tions afforded by the sui generis regime by accessing databases through libraries. 
299. See id. art. 8(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996); see also id. art. 15, O.J. L 77/20, 
at 27 (1996) (making contrary contractual provisions null and void).  Apparently, 
defining what constitutes an “insubstantial part” is a definitional task entrusted 
to the European Court of Justice.  See Gaster, supra note 128, at . 
300. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 8(2), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996); cf. 
Berne Convention, supra note 8, art. 9(2), 828 U.N.T.S. at 238-39. 
301. Database Directive, supra note 1, recitals 7-12, 38-42, 47, O.J. L 77/20, at 
20, 22-23, art. 7, O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996); see also Common Position, supra note 
150, Statement of the Council’s Reasons 14, O.J. C 288/02, at 26 (1995). 
302. Database Directive, supra note 1, recitals 7-12, 38-42, 47, O.J. L 77/20, at 
20, 22-23, art. 7, O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996); see also Common Position, supra note 
150, Statement of the Council’s Reasons 14, O.J. C 288/02, at 26 (1995). 
303. Note, however, that the value/price of data varies based on factors 
other than just timeliness.  For example, value-added features such as analyses, 
verification, or accompanying analytical tools increase the price of data.  In addi-
tion, data, like any other commodity, are subject to basic economic principles 
such as the law of supply and demand.  See generally ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH 
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such activity does not prejudice the database maker’s legiti-
mate, commercial interests. 
Moreover, the commercial focus of the Database Direc-
tive may convince the European courts to examine the na-
ture of the commercial interests affected when determining 
whether an extraction or reutilization is “substantial.”304  For 
example, a user extracting one week of old data can better 
argue that such an extraction was legitimate, or insubstan-
tial, than can a user who extracted one week of current, 
timely data.305 
Thus, the commercial focus of the Directive, coupled 
with the Commission’s decision to leave the task of defining 
“substantial part” to the European Court of Justice,306 per-
mits the European courts to view users through a commer-
cial lens to determine whether their extraction or reutiliza-
tion prejudices the database maker’s legitimate, commercial 
interests. 
b. The Optional “Fair Use” Shields 
The remaining “fair use” shields are optional and cannot 
be exercised in such a way as to prejudice the database 
maker’s rights.307  Some commentators argue that even if 
Member States adopt these optional shields, the Database 
Directive still fails to protect those advancing fundamental 
science.308 
                                                                                                                                  
OF NATIONS 49 (1776).  For example, raw, real-time financial data (equity quotes) 
can be obtained from several sources (such as CNNfn) free of charge (if one has 
Internet access).  However, because over time these same data become scarce 
(only those who capture and store the real-time data will possess the data), the 
supply curve shifts and, consequently, assuming the demand curve does not 
shift proportionately in a corresponding direction, the price of these data in-
creases.  See generally MILTON H. SPENCER, CONTEMPORARY MACROECONOMICS 43-
56 (7th ed. 1990). 
304. See supra notes 193, 301. 
305. But see note 303. 
306. See supra note 128. 
307. Database Directive, supra note 1, recital 50, O.J. L 77/20, at 23 (1996). 
308. See GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 13-14 (arguing that these shields are 
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Assuming the Member States adopt these shields, they 
collectively allow extraction of substantial parts of publicly-
available databases for private purposes in the case of 
nonelectronic databases, and for illustration in teaching and 
for scientific research, provided the user indicates the source, 
to the extent justified by the noncommercial purpose; and 
extraction and reutilization of substantial parts for public se-
curity, administrative, or judicial purposes.309 
The first optional shield, which permits extraction of sub-
stantial parts of publicly-available databases for private pur-
poses,310 illogically distinguishes between nonelectronic and 
electronic databases.  By using high-speed scanners and op-
tical character recognition software, nonelectronic databases 
can be electronically converted almost as easily as electronic 
databases.311  Moreover, the reasons given by the Council for 
extending the scope of the Database Directive to include 
nonelectronic databases apply equally here, but apparently 
received no consideration.312 
The second optional shield, which permits extraction of 
substantial parts of publicly-available databases for illustra-
tion for teaching or for scientific research,313 could go far in 
ameliorating the concerns of those decrying the Database Di-
rective’s sui generis regime because of its potential effect on 
research.314  Provided the user indicates the source, and can 
justify the use as noncommercial, only the database maker’s 
legitimate interests limit the user’s ability to use the contents 
of the database for the “purposes of illustration for teaching 
                                                                                                                                  
of little use to those conducting scientific research). 
309. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 9, O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996).  The 
third and final optional shield, permitting not only extraction, but also reutiliza-
tion of substantial parts of the database, in the interests of public security, and 
for the purposes of administrative or judicial procedures, is not discussed herein. 
310. Id. art. 9(a), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996). 
311. See supra note 190. 
312. See Common Position, supra note 150, Statement of the Council’s Rea-
sons 8, O.J. C 288/02, at 24 (1995). 
313. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 9(b), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996). 
314. See supra note 23. 
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or scientific research.”315 
Some argue that this second optional shield is merely 
“fool’s gold,” which reinforces the overly protective thrust of 
the Database Directive.316  Under this view, the scientist can 
illustrate his or her conclusions, but cannot browse the data-
base or use the collected data without succumbing to the 
monopoly power of the sole-source database maker.  Al-
though one could read the Database Directive in this man-
ner, a careful, contextual reading supports the previous 
view:317 noncommercial uses of the database contents for the 
purposes of illustration for teaching or for scientific research 
is limited only by the legitimate interests of the database 
maker.318 
Even if the European courts follow the parsimonious 
view of the second optional shield, the fact remains that 
anyone, including individual academicians or collective sci-
entific and technical institutions, can become database mak-
ers.319  This fact should not be dismissed lightly, either by le-
gal or economic theorists, or by commercial data compilers, 
because, by wielding the rights afforded by the Database Di-
rective’s sui generis regime, the information-producing aca-
 
315. Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 9, O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996); see su-
pra note 305. 
316. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 89-90. 
317. Id.  The latter view ignores the difference between the shield provided 
in the copyright domain and the shield provided in the sui generis domain.  Com-
pare Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(2)(b), O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996) (“for 
the sole purpose of illustration for teaching or scientific research”) (copyright do-
main) with Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 9(b), O.J. L 77/20, at 26 (1996) 
(for the purposes of illustration for teaching or scientific research) (sui generis do-
main) (emphasis added); cf. Gaster, supra note 128, at  (noting that the excep-
tions “usually only relate to the extraction right . . . because re-utilization is pre-
dominantly of a commercial nature”). 
318. Logically, the database maker’s legitimate interests will be broader vis-
à-vis the academic or scientist if the database is designed for, and marketed to, 
the academic or scientific communities.  However, the scientist or academic can 
still resort to the mandatory shields discussed above. 
319. See supra note 13. 
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demic and scientific communities320 could potentially be-
come gatekeepers to the technical and scientific data mar-
ket.321 
The significance of the scientific and academic communi-
ties fending for themselves in a commercialized information 
market is considered more fully in the context of the oppor-
tunities and threats to basic science discussed in Part IV of 
this Article.  For now, it is sufficient to note that even if the 
second optional shield proves to be “fool’s gold,” the swords 
and shields available in the EC should ensure that the toll 
fence raised by the Database Directive remains a pro-
competitive fence, not an insuperable monopolistic wall.322 
D. Effects within the European Community 
Although the shadow of protection cast by the Database 
Directive’s sui generis regime will remain uncertain until in-
terpreted by the authoritative administrative and judicial 
bodies, to the extent that legal protections create incentives 
 
320. See, e.g., SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS, supra note 23, at 5-30 (not-
ing that, in 1993 alone, 414,000 articles were published in the 4,681 peer-reviewed 
natural science and engineering journals recognized in the Institute of Scientific 
Information’s Scientific Citation Index). 
321. Indeed, the scientific community has begun to assume this role in some 
scientific disciplines.  See, e.g., Paul Ginsparg, Winners and Losers in the Global Re-
search Village 3 (visited May 11, 1997) <http://www.lanl.gov/blurb/ 
pg96unesco.html> (noting that automated online archives of physics research, 
contributed by the scientific community, has virtually supplanted conventional 
journals); see also J. C. Sens, Electronic Publishing via Scientific Societies (visited 
May 11, 1997) <http://www.grainger.uiuc.edu/icsu/sens.htm> (outlining a 
proposal for a non-profit organization to provide unreviewed scientific articles 
free of charge, and to provide reviewed articles at a cost sufficient to finance the 
non-profit organization).  If this trend continues, the “freedom of information” 
position taken by some in the academic and scientific communities will be put to 
the test, and we shall see precisely how “free” those communities believe infor-
mation should be. 
322. But cf. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 90 (arguing that the pro-
tection afforded by the Database Directive to data is exceeded only by the protec-
tion granted by the classic patent paradigm); see also GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 
4, at 35 (arguing that under “an exclusive rights model . . . a database owner[] 
[has an] absolute monopoly . . . .”). 
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to produce,323 the sui generis regime should increase database 
production in the EC.324  At the same time, the United States 
Supreme Court has left diligent compilers in the United 
States vulnerable to the misappropriative efforts of parasitic 
competitors and information Samaritans.325  Unless the 
United States adopts a regime providing equivalent protec-
tion, the synergistic effect of these two factors, coupled with 
the increasing convergence of the European market, may in-
deed help the EC achieve their goal of gaining a larger share 
of the worldwide database market.326 
With respect to nonproprietary data, the Database Direc-
tive’s sui generis regime should increase information avail-
ability and accessibility within the EC by increasing produc-
tion incentives.327  In addition, because protection is linked 
to production costs, rather than the superficial form of the 
final product, the Database Directive’s sui generis regime 
should operate without the price-distorting effects of an en-
hanced copyright regime.328 
While increased information availability and accessibility 
under the Database Directive’s sui generis regime will come 
at a certain price, absent adequate production incentives in-
 
323. Perritt, supra note 4, at 261 (citing Locke and Blackstone); Karjala II, su-
pra note 38, at 2594 (explaining that an absence of legal protection for intellectual 
property acts as a disincentive to invest); Lunney, supra note 64, at 486 n.5 (prop-
erty rights are used to provide incentives to invest in intellectual property pro-
duction); Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 349. 
324. See Samuelson, supra note 11, at 6 (pointing out that the two countries 
with the biggest market share have historically protected “noncreative” labors of 
database makers through “sweat of the brow” and “industrious collection” ra-
tionales).  However, the Database Directive’s sui generis regime could reduce in-
centives in Great Britain where ‘sweat-of-the-brow’ databases already enjoy pro-
tection under copyright law.  See supra note 8. 
325. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 
(1991); supra note 10 (discussing information Samaritans). 
326. See Database Directive, supra note 1, recitals 11-12, O.J. L 77/20, at 20 
(1996). 
327. See supra notes 236, 322-23. 
328. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text; see also Denicola, supra 
note 12, at 530. 
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formation seekers still pay a price:  instead of paying a fee to 
access an available database, information seekers pay in the 
form of lost-opportunity costs—costs incurred in the form of 
time and effort expended in finding the information,329 as-
suming the information can be found at all.  Thus, in the case 
of nonproprietary data, the Database Directive will give in-
formation seekers an otherwise unavailable choice:  pay the 
gatherer for her efforts and marshal their energies toward 
uses they deem more valuable, or gather their own data.330 
In contrast, in the case of some proprietary or sole-source 
data, information seekers are not given a choice—they can-
not practicably go forth and gather their own data.331  How-
ever, the swords and shields available in the EC may inject 
enough legal uncertainty in the minds of would-be data mo-
nopolizers to encourage them to engage in reasonable be-
havior vis-à-vis competitors and others seeking licenses.332  In 
light of these mechanisms, and the Database Directive’s 
mandated triennial assessment of the sui generis rights con-
cerning abusive and anticompetitive behavior,333 concerns 
regarding the Database Directive’s anticompetitive effects 
and effect on information flow within the EC,334 while not 
eliminated, are probably overstated.335 
IV. THE DATABASE DIRECTIVE:  STEPPING STONE TO AN 
 
329. See generally A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND 
ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989). 
330. Because of the explosive growth of the Internet the latter choice is be-
coming increasingly available.  See supra notes 230-31. 
331. See supra note 199 (defining “sole-source data”). 
332. Cf. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 149 (arguing that the legal 
uncertainty arising from fair use requirements gives producers and users 
“maximum incentives to negotiate . . . licenses” on reasonable terms). 
333. See Database Directive, supra note 1, art. 16, O.J. L 77/20, at 27 (1996); 
see also id. recital 47, O.J. L 77/20, at 23 (1996). 
334. See supra notes 22-23, 205 and accompanying text. 
335. It seems more plausible to assume that the EC will respond to problems 
associated with the Database Directive, than to assume that it will continue 
shooting itself in the foot after a problem is detected. 
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 INTERNATIONAL MODEL 
This part first proposes that any international sui generis 
regime modeled on the Database Directive be modified by 
incorporating a compulsory licensing mechanism to enable 
competition in the case of sole-source data.  This part then 
examines the purported hazards lurking, and the opportuni-
ties awaiting, the scientific and academic communities in an 
environment that privately allocates information based upon 
price. 
A. Enabling Competition in a Commercialized Information 
Market 
Collectively, the Database Directive, along with suprana-
tional and national European competition laws (“European 
competition law”), provide ameliorative mechanisms suffi-
cient to offset, or permit downstream adjustments to com-
pensate for, the potential problems associated with a regime 
which may permit de facto, although not de jure, ownership 
rights in sole-source data.336  However, similar ameliorative 
mechanisms, like the pro-competitive “Excalibur-like” sword 
found in Magill and other pro-competition policies embed-
ded in European competition law,337 are not available at an 
international level.338  Consequently, an international sui 
generis regime may require a mechanism to ensure that new 
and value-added information products are not kept off the 
market by those who refuse to license sole-source data.339 
 
336. See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text. 
337. See supra notes 277-92 and accompanying text. 
338. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 29, at 487-90 (noting the lack of any coherent 
international competition law and discussing five scenarios where the two major 
models, United States antitrust law and EC competition law, would likely differ 
in application). 
339. See, e.g., Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 77. 
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1. Mandating Licenses in the Case of Sole-Source 
Data 
One such mechanism, found in the sui generis regime ini-
tially proposed by the EC, is a compulsory licensing 
scheme.340  A compulsory licensing mechanism could be 
loosely modeled on the compulsory licensing mechanism 
copyright provides for nondramatic musical works.341  Prop-
erly designed, such a mechanism could enhance competition 
in a fully commercialized information market by ensuring 
that value-added products are not kept off the market by da-
tabase makers who refuse to license sole-source data, and by 
ensuring that the specter of competition hovers as a potential 
restraint on those database makers inclined to seek monopo-
listic rents for sole-source data. 
2. Compulsory Licenses Should Serve the Interests 
of the Database Maker and the Public 
A compulsory licensing mechanism could be designed 
with a dual rate structure, one based on a statutory mini-
mum rate, the other based upon the database maker’s actual 
costs.  Such a rate structure could protect the public’s inter-
est in competition in the sole-source data market without 
unduly prejudicing the commercial interests of the database 
maker. 
As a starting point, the statutory rate could be deter-
mined by multiplying the number of bytes342 reused or ex-
 
340. See Initial Proposal, supra note 11, art. 8, O.J. C 156/03, at 9 (1992); 
Amended Proposal, supra note 24, art. 11, O.J. C 308/01, at 13-14 (1993) (mandat-
ing compulsory licenses on “fair and nondiscriminatory terms” in the case of 
sole-source data); cf. Reichman, supra note 10, at 2539-44 (proposing off-the-rack 
liability regime with built-in compulsory license); see also Samuelson et al., supra 
note 35, at 2412-14. 
341. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C.A. § 115 (West Supp. 1996). 
342. “Byte” is a term used to quantify data streams.  See, e.g., THE AMERICAN 
HERITAGE COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 194 (3d ed. 1993) (defining a “byte” as equiva-
lent to one character or eight bits). 
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tracted times a small charge, such as a fraction of a cent, or 
other appropriate monetary unit.343  Alternatively, database 
makers should remain free to reject the statutory rate in fa-
vor of a second rate structure based upon actual costs. 
Under this second rate structure, the database maker 
should bear the burden of proving actual costs associated 
with particular data, but could thereafter charge accord-
ingly.344  This rate structure would legitimately enable data-
base makers with high data-collection costs, or narrow mar-
kets over which to spread their data-collection costs, to 
recover a greater proportion of their costs from would-be 
competitors. 
 
343. Cf. 17 U.S.C.A. § 115 (covering mechanical copyright royalties).  A fur-
ther refinement of the compulsory licensing scheme might include a prohibition 
on substantial electronic extraction and conversion by competitors for a short 
blocking period designed to provide the maker with sufficient lead-time to re-
cover her costs in the market.  Cf. Samuelson et al., supra note 35, at 2412-14 
(blocking period followed by compulsory license); see also Reichman, supra note 
10, at 2544-51.  In addition, a compulsory licensing mechanism might encourage 
formation of private collection societies which would permit interested parties to 
bargain around the statutory rate.  Cf. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 
140 (noting that the Harry Fox agency acts as a “de facto collection society 
[for] . . . some 200,000 voluntary licenses . . .”); cf. Kennedy & Dweck, supra note 
53, at C17 (reporting that the Author’s Guild and the American Society of Jour-
nalists formed the Author’s Registry this year to represent freelance writers in an 
effort to impose usage-based royalties on publishers for electronic uses of their 
works).  Professors Reichman and Samuelson suggest that a statutory rate be set 
by industry in light of two criteria:  (1) the cost-recovery principle familiar to sci-
entific agencies, which focuses on the reasonableness of profit margins, and (2) 
the value the licensed data adds to the fair follower’s product. See Reichman & 
Samuelson, supra note 4, at 140.  They also suggest that a statutory rate would 
result in bargaining by users and producers, and would permit “a more nuanced 
schedule of royalties . . . than a statute could . . . institute.”  Id. at 141. 
344. Although the database maker might incur additional costs in proving 
actual costs, proving them should be less costly than triggering competition law 
because the maker need only produce reliable evidence of her data collection 
costs.  Moreover, since each sui generis regime saddles the database maker with 
the burden of proving substantial investment, the prudent database maker will 
have adequate documentation of investment costs.  See Database Directive, supra 
note 1, art. 7(1), O.J. L 77/20, at 25 (1996); H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, §§ 2, 
3(a), 6(a); WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, Note 2.07 WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 
30, 1996) (“[i]n any dispute, it is the burden of the maker of the database to dem-
onstrate the necessary investment”); see also Gaster, supra note 128, at  
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At the same time, users and competitors seeking to use 
the sole-source data should remain free to challenge data-
base makers who opt for the second rate structure, and 
should reap the benefits of a successful challenge by obtain-
ing the data at lesser of the statutory rate or the actual 
cost.345  Finally, to further encourage bargaining, and to fi-
nance the administrative mechanism to arbitrate actual cost 
disputes, the loser could be assessed costs, including costs 
incurred by the other party and administrative costs.  Such a 
dual rate structure could accommodate a negotiated “menu 
of liability options”346 analogous to Professors Reichman and 
Samuelson’s proposal for a liability regime,347 without un-
fairly saddling database makers with the bill for subsidizing 
downstream data users. 
3. Prohibiting Exclusive Licensing Arrangements 
To further ensure that competition reigns in the data 
market, exclusive licensing arrangements with sole-source 
data producers could be deemed void against public policy.  
Thus modified by introducing liability principles,348 an in-
ternational sui generis regime modeled on the Database Di-
rective could ensure that competition performs its protective 
role349 even in the case of sole-source data.350 
 
345. If the database industry chose to form a collection society to minimize 
transaction costs associated with licensing, the first appeal might lie within the 
collection society.  See supra note 342.  Thereafter, either party could appeal the 
actual cost determination to an appropriate court or, if the mechanism so pro-
vides, an arbitration committee. 
346. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 141. 
347. Id. 
348. See Initial Proposal, supra note 11, art. 8, O.J. C 156/03, at 9 (1992); 
Amended Proposal, supra note 24, art. 11, O.J. C 308/01, at 13-14 (1993) (mandat-
ing compulsory licenses on “fair and nondiscriminatory terms” in the case of 
sole-source data); cf. Reichman, supra note 10, at 2539-44 (proposing off-the-rack 
liability regime with built-in compulsory license); see also Samuelson et al., supra 
note 35, at 2412-14; cf. 17 U.S.C.A. § 115. 
349. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d at 1453 (citation omitted) (noting that competition 
protects consumers in a free market economy). 
350. See supra note 199 (defining “sole-source data”). 
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A compulsory licensing mechanism will not, however, 
aid competition in markets without sufficient demand to 
support additional competitors:  neither will it aid competi-
tion in areas where information is provided under nonmar-
ket conditions, the conditions under which some scientists 
perform basic research and development.351 
B. Potential Effects on Basic Research and Development 
Assessing the role research352 and development353 
(“R&D”) plays in technological innovation, and its resulting 
societal effects, is an extremely complex task.354  The com-
plexity of the task stems in part from the complexity in fund-
 
351. For example, scientists and other users can obtain publicly-funded in-
formation on a cost-recovery basis by the United States to scientists and other 
users.  See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West Supp. 1996); 
GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 22; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 113.  
In addition, the Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
231, 110 Stat. 3048 (effective October 2, 1996), requires federal agencies to pro-
vide that information in “any form or format requested . . . if the [information] is 
readily reproducible by the agency in that form or format.”  See 5 U.S.C.A. § 
552(a)(3)(B). 
352. Conventional innovation models, which presume a linear innovation 
process, generally divide research into two levels:  basic and applied.  See 
SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS, supra note 23, at 4-9.  “Basic research” seeks 
to further scientific knowledge for its own sake, without regard to specific appli-
cations.  Id.  “Applied research” seeks to determine the means by which a par-
ticular, specified need can be met.  Id.  However, most innovation experts recog-
nize that the innovation process is far more complex than the linear model 
suggests.  See id. (citing Donald Stokes forthcoming book, PASTEUR’S QUADRANT).  
Stokes classifies research into three levels:  pure basic research (research con-
ducted solely in the quest for basic understanding), pure applied research (re-
search conducted solely for its potential use), and strategic research (research 
conducted both for its potential use and for basic understanding).  Id.  As used 
herein, “basic research” means pure basic research.  In addition, except when 
stated otherwise, this section examines data reflecting only United States re-
search and development patterns. 
353. “Development” is the systematic use of the products of research, 
knowledge and understanding, toward the production of useful products, proc-
esses, or services.  SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS, supra note 23, at 4-9. 
354. The complexity stems not only from informational difficulties, but also 
from differing analytical and philosophical approaches.  Id. at 8-3 (citations omit-
ted). 
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ing the R&D process,355 from the difficulties in assessing the 
spillover effects of R&D,356 and from the difficulties in at-
taching value to the benefits derived from technological 
growth.357  This section does not attempt such a monumental 
task, but rather attempts only a general assessment of the 
potential effects of a sui generis regime which protects the in-
vestment of database makers, on a subcomponent of the 
R&D process:  “basic research.”358 
According to some of those charged with conducting ba-
sic research, even if an international sui generis regime is not 
 
355. In the United States, R&D is performed and funded by industry, gov-
ernment, and academia.  See id. at 4-2.  Of the $171 billion spent on R&D in the 
United States in 1995, 60% was spent on development, 23% was spent on applied 
research, and 17% (approximately $29.6 billion) was spent on basic research.  See 
id. at 4-9  Although industry funds and performs the majority of overall R&D, 
the majority of industry funds are spent on applied research and development.  
See id. at 4-5 to 4-7 (reporting that, in 1995, industry provided approximately 59% 
of total R&D expenditures in the United States, and performed approximately 
70% of the total R&D).  In the area of basic research, the federal government pro-
vides the majority of funding, while the academic sector performs most of the 
basic research.  SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS, supra note 23, at 4-9 (report-
ing that federally-allocated funds comprised approximately 58% of the $29.6 bil-
lion spent on basic research); see id. (reporting that academia performed ap-
proximately 50% of basic research conducted in the United States in 1995).  
Although all three sectors have experienced a reduction in the rate of growth in 
dollars spent on research and development, academia is the only sector that has 
experienced a constant dollar increase since 1986.  Id. 
356. Because basic research is often shared among scientists, e.g., by publi-
cation in scientific journals and by private circulation among colleagues, it is dif-
ficult for those conducting the research to capture the ripple effects, or spillover 
benefits produced by the research.  See id. at 8-6 to 8-7.  In addition, initial re-
search may find application (“spillover”) in other industrial sectors and scientific 
disciplines.  See id. at 6-4, 8-6, to 8-7.  Finally, the ripple effect of basic research 
conducted in academic institutions represents a “crucial component in training 
future scientists and engineers, many of whom will one day be working in [in-
dustrial] laboratories.”  SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS, supra note 23, at 4-10. 
357. For example, the difficulties inherent in attaching a monetary value to 
technological breakthroughs that save human lives; or, in attaching a monetary 
value to the more general benefit of promoting a “culture of reasoned discourse.”  
See id. at 8-10 to 8-11. 
358. Unlike “applied research,” which seeks to determine the means by 
which a particular, specified need can be met, “basic research” seeks to further 
scientific knowledge without regard to specific application.  See id. at 4-9. 
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adopted, the Database Directive may cause a paradigmatic 
shift in the way basic research is conducted.359  This concern 
rests on the argument that because the Database Directive’s 
sui generis regime may create de facto property rights in basic 
research data, the “principle of full and open exchange” will 
give way to “mini-monopolies” which will in turn signifi-
cantly diminish long-term R&D capabilities.360  The follow-
ing subsection delineates those concerns. 
1. Concerns Expressed by Those Conducting Basic 
Research 
Opponents of the Database Directive’s sui generis regime, 
and of an international sui generis regime modeled on the 
Database Directive, cite three main concerns, all of which 
center on the effect of such a regime on the accessibility of 
data.361  First, they argue that an international sui generis re-
gime will give database makers an absolute monopoly on 
data.362  Because of this exclusive right in data, critics claim, 
the database maker will either deny access or charge a price 
that science cannot pay.363 
 
359. See, e.g., GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 27; Academy Letter, supra note 
23, at 2 (discussing “ethos of sharing”); see generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE 
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970). 
360. See GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 14; Academy Letter, supra note 23, 
at 2; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 91; Rosler, supra note 11, at 140-41. 
361. However, even those opposing the current proposals agree that the 
“core idea underlying current sui generis proposals is sound, even if the mecha-
nisms proposed to address the problem are flawed.”  See Reichman & Sam-
uelson, supra note 4, at 130.  Additional concerns expressed by opponents were 
addressed previously with respect to Database Directive’s effects within the EC.  
See supra notes 277-321 and accompanying text. 
362. See Academy Letter, supra note 23, at 1-2; Reichman & Samuelson, supra 
note 4, 90-102 (arguing that each regime grants monopoly rights); GLOBAL 
ACCESS, supra note 4, at 35 (arguing that under “an exclusive rights model . . . a 
database owner[] [has an] absolute monopoly”). 
363. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 115-16; see also GLOBAL 
ACCESS, supra note 4, at 8-9.  Although the sui generis regime may lead to higher 
data costs, in the form of fees or independent generation costs, charging for data 
is not a revolutionary concept.  Information is not, nor has it ever been free—
someone, whether it be the government, or other information users who subsi-
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Second, opponents argue that, because any entity can 
find protection under such a sui generis regime,364 foreign 
governments will enter the database markets and charge 
market prices for publicly-funded data previously supplied 
on a cost-recovery basis.365  Critics project that this develop-
ment, coupled with the incentive to privatize data, will re-
sult in an ever-shrinking pool of public domain informa-
tion.366 
Finally, opponents argue that the incentive to privatize 
data created by such a regime is antithetical to the principle 
of “full and open exchange” of scientific data.367  Critics 
speculate that the collective effect of this “parade of horri-
bles,”368 which would follow adoption of such a sui generis 
regime,369 could have grave consequences to the United 
States’ ability to maintain its lead in technological innova-
tion.370 
2. Potential Benefits to Those Conducting Basic 
Research 
Although de facto property rights in data causes much 
concern to those whose lifeblood is data, a regime which 
                                                                                                                                  
dize information pirates and parasites, has always paid the price.  See Pamela 
Samuelson, Information as Property:  D. Ruckelshaus and Carpenter, Signal Changing 
Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 367 (1989).  More-
over, in some degree information has always existed as a commodity available to 
those with the wherewithal to purchase it.  Id. 
364. However, note that H.R. 3531 specifically excludes governmental agen-
cies and employees in their official capacity from the scope of its protection.  See 
H.R. REP. NO. 3531, supra note 1, § 2. 
365. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 115-16; GLOBAL ACCESS, su-
pra note 4, at 15. 
366. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 117, 128; see also GLOBAL 
ACCESS, supra note 4, at 34-35. 
367. See Academy Letter, supra note 23, at 2; Reichman & Samuelson, supra 
note 4, at 114 (arguing that basic science requires an abundant infusion of “cheap 
data in ways that encourage serendipity and playful exploration”). 
368. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 128. 
369. Id. 
370. See id. at 115-17. 
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grants the commercial database maker a de facto property 
right in data grants the same right to the dedicated-
researcher-turned-database-maker.371  Thus, while the poten-
tial negative effects demand careful attention by policy mak-
ers before adopting an international sui generis regime mod-
eled on the Database Directive,372 policy makers should 
assess the potential negative effects in light of the potential 
benefits to those decrying the Directive and the Proposals it 
has spawned, and in light of the potential benefits to society 
as a whole. 
a. Market Participation 
Those conducting basic research and their employers, 
universities, for example, are not only data users, but are 
also data producers.  As data producers, researchers can en-
gage the market for protection.  For example, the academic 
and scientific communities might collectively organize and 
form large databases fed continually by their respective 
communities.373  Given the sheer volume of information 
 
371. Moreover, the term of the de facto monopoly will be determined by the 
difficulty of unearthing the data and the relevant database market.  That is, the 
data collector will face price competition earlier, or data users will independently 
generate the data, if data are relatively easy to independently discover and gen-
erate.  Conversely, if data are relatively difficult to discover or generate, the data 
collector may receive a longer term of protection. 
372. These effects should also be considered by EC members when imple-
menting the Database Directive.  See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, at 108 
(noting that even if an international sui generis regime is not adopted, the Data-
base Directive may force a paradigmatic shift in the way scientists, academics, 
and others operating in a noncompetitive or subsidized environment, conduct 
research and other information-intensive activities); see also  GLOBAL ACCESS, su-
pra note 4, at 25-26 (arguing that EC members should implement the Database 
Directive by freighting “data generated by public funds . . . with a built-in, cost-
based discount for scientific research and education as a condition of further 
commercialization by others”). 
373. Although this may require some logistical nimbleness, given today’s 
software tools, it takes relatively little programming expertise to form a database 
which would find protection under the Database Directive.  Moreover, the aca-
demic research community typically has ready access to programming expertise 
and computer hardware. Griffith Interview, supra note 40.  In addition, formation 
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produced by these communities,374 an international sui gene-
ris regime might not only provide these communities with 
significant bargaining power in the commercial sector, but 
might also empower these communities to influence 
fundamental information policy. 
Moreover, armed with this new-found bargaining power, 
the academic and scientific communities could engage the 
market in a number of ways.  For example, they could en-
gage commercial database makers in partnerships, provid-
ing data in exchange for innovative research tools and cost 
recovery access.375 
Alternatively, the academic and scientific communities 
could choose to enter the market as database makers.376  As 
market participants, these communities could employ the re-
sulting profits to replace ever-shrinking governmental 
funds,377 to pay for production costs, to pay for additional 
research and educational activities, or to pay individual re-
searchers via a collection society.378 
                                                                                                                                  
of a collection society might reduce transaction costs which might otherwise 
make small transactions cost-prohibitive.  See Thomas K. Landry, Columbia-VLA 
Journal of Law & The Arts Roundtable on Electronic Rights, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & 
ARTS 605, 645 (1996). 
374. See supra note 320. 
375. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 4, 108-10; cf. SCIENCE & EN-
GINEERING INDICATORS, supra note 23, at 5-43 (noting that the strong upward trend 
in gross revenues generated by academic patenting indicates an awareness and 
willingness on the part of private industry to invest in academia) citing a 1994 
survey conducted by the Association of University Technology Managers, Inc. 
376. See Hunsucker, supra note 219, at 35-36; cf. SCIENCE & ENGINEERING 
INDICATORS, supra note 23, at 5-42 (noting that the sevenfold increase in the num-
ber of patents awarded to the academic sector between 1960 and 1980 suggests 
that the academic sector is attempting to capture some of the economic benefits 
associated with basic research). 
377. See, e.g., id. at 4-21 (noting the decline, in real terms, of overall federal 
R&D expenditures). 
378. Cf. BIERDERMAN, ET AL., LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE ENTERTAINMENT 
INDUSTRIES 526-27 (3d ed. 1996) (describing ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC, collection 
societies who collect and distribute fees generated by performing rights); see also 
Landry, supra note 373, at 642 (describing the Authors Registry, a collection soci-
ety which collects royalties on electronic distribution of written articles). 
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b. An International Treaty Addressing Publicly-
Funded Data 
While some governmental data are not reproducible and 
may not be subject to the limits of a competitive market,379 
many of these data are presently available on a cost-recovery 
basis pursuant to bilateral or multilateral treaties.380  Addi-
tionally, although foreign governments may use the sui 
generis regime to finance government-sponsored research ef-
forts, or may discriminate against researchers in the United 
States,381 there are practical limits on the ability of foreign 
governments to do so. 
Consider, for example, that the United States accounts for 
approximately forty-four percent of the world’s R&D in-
vestment, outdistancing the next four largest investors com-
bined.382  Governments who discriminate against researchers 
in the United States, or who charge market prices for pub-
licly-funded data, risk similar treatment from the United 
States.  The threat of retaliation by the United States might 
act as an implicit limit on the price foreign governments 
charge for publicly-funded data. 
Moreover, rather than face the wrath of its own citizens 
by charging market prices for publicly-financed data, the 
United States might exercise its strength in R&D to persuade 
 
379. For example, data provided via governmentally-operated satellites.  
See, e.g., GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 22. 
380. Id.; see also Bilateral Relations, Executive Summary 6 (visited Nov. 11, 
1996)  (noting that “during 
FY-1995 there were 805 S&T [Science & Technology] agreements in force be-
tween the U.S. and 78 other countries.”  For a representative listing of the current 
bilateral agreements, see
 In addition, one should note that international scientific col-
laboration and cooperation is increasing.  See SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS, 
supra note 23, at 5-35-37 (noting greater international collaboration on scientific 
and engineering articles); 4-42-48 (noting increasing international collaboration 
in the public and private sectors). 
381. See supra note 365. 
382. SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS, supra note 23, at 4-35 and tables 4-
33-4-35 (note that these data reflect total R&D, not just basic research). 
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foreign governments to supply publicly-financed data to sci-
ence on reasonable terms.383  Alternatively, foreign action 
regarding publicly-funded data which the United States per-
ceives as unfair may precipitate a single international treaty 
addressing publicly-funded data.384  
c. Reducing Inefficiencies Masked by Hidden 
Subsidies 
Subjecting basic research to the discipline of a commer-
cialized data market may reduce hidden costs imposed by 
the systemic inefficiencies associated with research con-
ducted under less-than-market conditions.  For example, 
openly charging for data may give users a financial incentive 
to make decisions based upon actual need, which may result 
in more focused research. 
In contrast, “free” access to information, which is not 
really free but rather subsidized by someone else, may en-
courage unnecessary and unfocused research on systems 
with finite capacities, which may render systems unavailable 
to others.  Thus, attaching a market price to information may 
lead to wider data availability and accessibility by freeing 
what would otherwise be unavailable system capacity. 
d. Not a Threat to Technological Innovation 
Even if imposing additional costs on basic research, 
whether in the form of fees or of independent generation 
costs, shifts the focus of basic research from the discovery of 
knowledge for its own sake to the discovery of knowledge to 
solve a particular societal problem, it does not necessarily 
 
383. See, e.g., GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 27; see also supra note 351 (cit-
ing the Freedom of Information Act). 
384. For example, an international treaty might require governments to 
supply their data on “fair and nondiscriminatory terms.”  See supra note 338; cf. 
GLOBAL ACCESS, supra note 4, at 25 (arguing that publicly-funded data should 
come freighted with a built-in discount for science). 
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follow that such a shift will reduce the number of techno-
logical breakthroughs.  On the contrary, some empirical evi-
dence suggests that technological breakthroughs are just as 
likely to precede, rather than follow, basic research.385 
Thus, while the Database Directive’s sui generis regime, 
or an international sui generis regime modeled on the Data-
base Directive, poses risks to academic and scientific re-
searchers, it also presents many opportunities to those same 
researchers (or those making the substantial investment in 
database production), including the opportunity to recover 
some spillover subsidies they currently provide to the indus-
trial sector.386 
C. Potential Benefits to Society 
Like the railroad of yesteryear, information is the engine 
that drives commercial innovation and social advance-
ment;387 it is the cornerstone of electronic commerce.388  Mil-
 
385. See supra note 350 (regarding linear/nonlinear innovation models); see 
also SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS, supra note 23, at 4-9 (citing Donald 
Stokes forthcoming book, PASTEUR’S QUADRANT, which sets forth examples of 
real world technological breakthroughs accomplished by those such as Pasteur, 
Faraday, and Kelvin, whose research focused on both fundamental understand-
ing and potential application; see also id. at 5-42 (noting that the academic sector, 
which performs most of the basic research, is increasingly focusing on commer-
cially relevant technologies). 
386. See supra note 354. 
387. See WIPO Proposal, supra note 1, Preamble WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 
(Aug. 30, 1996) (“[D]atabases are a vital element in the development of a global 
information infrastructure and an essential tool for promoting economic, cul-
tural, and technological advancement . . . .” ; 142 CONG. REC. E890-04 (daily ed. 
May 23, 1996) (statement of Sen. Moorhead) (“[D]atabases . . .  the linchpin of a 
dynamic commercial industry in the United States.”); Database Directive, supra 
note 1, recital 9, O.J. L 77/20, at 20 (1996); cf. Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV In-
dus., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The future of the nation depends in no 
small part on the efficiency of industry, . . . [which in turn] depends in no small 
part on the protection of intellectual property.”); see also Samuelson, supra note 
363, at 367 (“In the information age, information becomes the primary economic 
commodity, the source of greatest wealth”); see generally, Jared Sandberg, Micro-
soft Plans to Spend Big on the Internet, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1996, at B3 (reporting 
that Microsoft plans to spend $400 million this year to development information 
content for its Internet services). 
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lions of information users, including scientists, professionals, 
scholars, consumers, and businessmen and women, make 
decisions based upon information every day.389  To the ex-
tent that a sui generis regime protecting investment in data-
bases increases the  production of databases, a tool that en-
hances information users’ ability to retrieve the kernel of 
information needed to solve a particular scientific, legal, 
economic, or medical problem, the regime would enhance 
society’s problem-solving abilities, increase productivity and 
decrease lost-opportunity costs,390 advance education and 
training, and facilitate the creation of a better-informed citi-
zenry.391 
Additionally, a sui generis regime protecting investment 
in databases could produce profound long-term societal 
benefits if such a regime subtly shifts macroeconomic incen-
tives from fictional works to more necessary factual works392 
having higher social utility.393  That is, assuming that legal 
protections create or protect incentives to produce, to the ex-
tent protection afforded factual works approaches or exceeds 
the protection afforded fictional works, societal resources 
                                                                                                                                  
388. See, e.g., Bradford L. Smith, Creating the Global Information Society:  Look-
ing Ahead, in 2 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW & POLICY 
(Hugh C. Hansen ed., forthcoming 1997) (explaining that users do not want new 
telecommunications equipment and computer hardware for its own sake, but 
rather for the information it allows them to access)  
389. 142 CONG. REC. E890-04 (daily ed. May 23, 1996) (statement of Sen. 
Moorhead). 
390. The lost opportunity costs consist of costs suffered by society in the 
form of nonproductive time spent searching for information.  See generally A. 
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989). 
391. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. E890-04 (daily ed. May 23, 1996) (statement of 
Sen. Moorhead). 
392. Although one could correct the imbalance by reducing the protection 
currently afforded traditionally copyrightability works to little more than protec-
tion against wholesale copying, that solution seems unlikely given the vested in-
terests in the copyright regime.  See generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining 
Copyrights’ Incentive Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483 (1996). 
393. By according factual works only a thin veil of copyright protection be-
cause of their high degree of social utility, society has implicitly, if not explicitly, 
deemed factual works more valuable than fictional works.  See Lunney, supra 
note 65, at 568-70. 
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should be redirected toward production of factual works.394  
Society would thus reap the benefit of increased production 
of more necessary factual information. 
CONCLUSION 
Market-destructive appropriators, commercially-
motivated or not, skew incentives to invest in information 
generation and compilation.  The EC took a bold, intellectu-
ally-honest step forward by adopting a sui generis regime to 
protect investment in databases.  The Directive’s sui generis 
regime does not create exclusive legal property rights in 
data, but does protect the investment of labor and capital, 
made by diligent compilers, in their compilations.  By link-
ing protection to the investment of capital and labor, the Da-
tabase Directive’s sui generis regime should increase, or at 
least preserve, incentives to collect and compile information 
in the EC.  Because independent creation and imitation re-
main, as they should, perfectly legitimate means of competi-
tion, the Directive’s sui generis regime protects compilers 
without unnecessarily suspending the principles of free 
competition in the nonproprietary data market. 
At the same time, this Article recognizes the risk of im-
peding competition in the sole-source data market and the 
incentives to privatize data that such a regime creates.  
Nonetheless, there are sufficient ameliorative measures 
available to those within the EC to offset these risks,  not the 
least of which is the fact that European courts will, if follow-
ing the spirit of the Directive, focus on the legitimate com-
mercial interests of the database maker when defining in-
fringement.  On the other hand, because of the lack of similar 
ameliorative measures at the international level, this Article 
suggests that an international sui generis regime modeled on 
 
394. See id. at 655-56; see Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 349 (the extent of copy-
right protection for databases influences the initial investment decision); see also 
supra note 323. 
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the Database Directive be modified by incorporating a com-
pulsory mechanism to protect the public’s interest in compe-
tition in the sole-source database and information markets. 
However, this Article does not agree with those who be-
lieve information should be free.  Society gains little by mak-
ing information free if, by so doing, it reduces the quantity 
and quality of information produced, or reduces the mone-
tary value attached to socially-productive behavior like basic 
research. 
On the other hand, if increasing the price of data results 
in greater remuneration to information producers, for exam-
ple, those engaged in basic research and science, society may 
attach a higher value to such socially-productive behavior, 
which in turn could result in more scientists and researchers, 
who could in turn produce more information.  Thus, greater 
remuneration to researchers and scientists may result in 
spillover effects that could have far-reaching social implica-
tions.  What, for example, might children think if society 
paid the next dedicated researcher laying the foundation for 
the next Salk or Pasteur as much as the next Danielle Steele, 
John Grisham, or Theodore Geisel?395 
 
 
 
395. Geisel is better known as Dr. Seuss; Steele and Grisham are successful 
contemporary novelists. 
